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Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A 
Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the 
Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings 
Peter L. Markowitz* 
I. iNTRODUCTION 
In 1889, in the infamous Chinese Exclusion Case, 1 the United States 
Supreme Court laid the foundation for the now well-established rule that 
immigration removal proceedings2 are civil, not criminal, in nature.3 Over a 
century later, the civil label is firmly embedded in our conception of removal 
proceedings, and the idea of criminal removal proceedings may seem 
counterintuitive to some. However, for noncitizens who have been the sub-
ject of both removal and traditional criminal proceedings, the two can be 
indistinguishable but for the relative lack of procedural protections and the 
often graver liberty interest at stake in the former. This Article seeks to ex-
plore the tension between the firmly established civil label and the contrary 
experience of people subject to removal proceedings. 
* Assistant Clinical Professor of Law at Cardozo School of Law. Before entering 
academia, I developed and ran an in-house immigration project at Toe Bronx Defenders, a 
public defender office. At Toe Bronx Defenders, I represented hundreds of individuals in both 
criminal and deportation proceedings. Much of the inspiration for and insight into this topic 
derives from my experience at Toe Bronx Defenders, and I owe a debt of gratitude to my 
clients and to my exceptional colleagues. In addition, I am grateful to Barry Friedman, Deep 
Gulasekaram, Randy Hertz, Nancy Morawetz, Juliet Stumpf, Bill Taylor, Michael Wishnie, the 
Hofstra Faculty Workshop participants, and the NYU Lawyering Faculty Scholarship Collo-
quium participants for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am also 
indebted to Anthony DeSacia, Vichal Kumar, David Peterson, Kristen Siracusa, and Lee Tur-
ner-Dodge for their superb research assistance. In addition, I would like to thank the Execu-
tive Office of Immigration Review for cooperating in providing some of the data used to 
prepare this article. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Amy, for reading countless drafts, 
offering invaluable insights and comments, and providing unending support. 
1 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
2 Immigration removal proceedings, colloquially referred to as "deportation proceedings," 
are the primary mechanism by which the government expels noncitizens from the United 
States or prevents their admission under the Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA"). 
Prior to 1996, there were two different types of such proceedings: "deportation proceedings" 
for noncitizens who had entered the United States and "exclusion proceedings" for noncitizens 
seeking admission. There is now a single type of proceeding-"removal proceedings"-
which encompasses both situations. For the sake of clarity, I will use "removal proceedings" 
as a blanket term to describe all proceedings whereby the United States government seeks to 
expel a noncitizen from within its borders or to exclude a noncitizen from entering, regardless 
of the point in history when those proceedings occurred. 
3 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606. Toe infamy of this case comes not from its conclusion 
that removal proceedings are civil but rather from the caustic anti-Asian sentiments laced 
throughout the opinion. 
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The Chinese Exclusion Case was, as its name implies, an exclusion 
case wherein the United States sought to prevent the entry of a noncitizen 
from outside its borders.4 Four years later, in Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States,5 the Supreme Court clarified that the civil designation of removal 
proceedings applies not only to exclusion cases, used to prevent the admis-
sion of noncitizens, but also to expulsion cases, used to expel noncitizens. 6 
Before Fong Yue Ting, this civil designation, now taken for granted, was the 
subject of considerable debate.7 Since its initial pronouncement in these 
early cases, the Supreme Court has, despite frequent criticism,8 relied on the 
principle of stare decisis and repeatedly refused to revisit the issue of 
whether removal proceedings are civil or criminal in nature.9 
My contribution to this inquiry is a bifurcated analysis based on the 
distinction between ( 1) "exclusion proceedings" seeking to prevent the 
physical entry and/or political admission of noncitizens and (2) "expulsion 
proceedings" seeking to expel lawful permanent residents 10 from within the 
United States. This bifurcated approach enables the otherwise conflicting 
guidance provided by current Supreme Court doctrine, the historical record, 
and the Supreme Court's claim regarding the nature and source of the sover-
eign immigration power to be reconciled. I conclude that the Supreme 
Court's fundamental error stems from Fong Yue Ting: assigning the civil des-
ignation to expulsion proceedings. This bifurcated approach leads to the con-
clusion that the determination of whether to exclude a noncitizen from 
entering is a civil proceeding, in which the respondent is shielded only by 
traditional civil due process protection, 11 but the determination whether to 
4 See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text. 
5 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
6 Id. at 730; see also infra notes 66-80 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra note 227 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
9 See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. l032, 1038 (1984) ("Consistent with the 
civil nature of the proceeding, various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial 
do not apply in a deportation hearing."); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) 
("Deportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil 
rather than a criminal procedure."); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952) ("Deporta-
tion is not a criminal proceeding and has never been held to be punishment."); Mahler v. Eby, 
264 U.S. 32, 38-39 (1924) (rejecting the argument that "the same constitutional restrictions 
apply to an alien deportation act as to a law punishing crime" because "[i]t is well settled that 
deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punishment"); 
United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923) (refusing to apply Fifth 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination "[s]ince the proceeding was not a criminal 
one"); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (noting that deportation "is not a 
conviction of crime, nor is the deportation a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the Govern-
ment to harbor persons whom it does not want"). 
10 Permanent residency is the most favored immigration status in the United States short 
of citizenship. Lawful permanent residents ("LPRs" or "permanent residents") are allowed to 
live and work in the United States indefinitely. But see INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000) 
(detailing the various grounds upon which a permanent resident can be deported). 
11 The level of due process protection applicable in exclusion proceedings would vary 
based upon the political and physical circumstances of the noncitizen respondent. See 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 721 (2001) (Kennedy, J ., dissenting) (noting that "both 
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expel a noncitizen whom the government has previously invited into the na-
tional community as a lawful permanent resident is a criminal proceeding, in 
which the defendant is entitled to the full panoply of criminal procedural 
protections guaranteed by the Constitution. 
The line I have drawn between exclusion and expulsion proceedings is 
not necessarily intuitive but neither is it arbitrary. At the outset, my catego-
ries are in need of some defense and explication. The current statutory 
framework draws a different line. Noncitizens in removal proceedings are 
subject to charges of "deportability"12 if they have been lawfully admitted to 
the country in any status; 13 they are subject to charges of "inadmissibility" 14 
if they are seeking admission, political or physical, or have entered the coun-
try unlawfully. Under the previous statutory framework, different categories 
were employed. Noncitizens were placed in "deportation proceedings" if 
they had physically entered the country, even unlawfully, and "exclusion 
proceedings" if they were seeking admission. 15 I reject both of these catego-
rizations and instead make the critical dividing line lawful admission to the 
United States as a permanent resident. Thus, as I define them, the terms 
"exclusion" and "expulsion" are political in nature. Exclusion applies to 
anyone who the government has not previously made the affirmative choice 
to admit into the national community as a permanent resident. 16 Expulsion 
proceedings are the government's attempt to cast out a noncitizen who was 
previously admitted to the national community as a permanent resident. 17 
removable and inadmissible aliens are entitled to be free from detention that is arbitrary or 
capricious"); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-34 (1982) (applying due process rights to 
returning permanent residents); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (stating that the Fifth 
and Rmrteenth Amendments protect aliens, including those in the country illegally); Galvan v. 
Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (noting that aliens have the same due process protections that 
citizens have); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) 
("[A)liens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after 
proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law 
. .. . But an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing: 'Whatever the 
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is con-
cerned."') (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)); 
Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 98 (1903) (holding that noncitizens get procedural due pro-
cess protection in deportation proceedings but stating that, with respect to noncitizens seeking 
initial entry, "the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers ex-
pressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law"). 
12 INA§ 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227. 
13 This category includes people who have come temporarily as tourists or students, for 
example, in addition to people who have been permanently admitted as residents. 
14 INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
15 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252b (repealed 1996). The 1996 law combined the two proceedings 
into a single proceeding known as a "removal proceeding." See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (Supp. 
1998); see also Zmivydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (relying on entry as critical dividing line for due 
process analysis). 
16 This includes noncitizens in a wide array of different situations. As I have defined it, 
noncitizens abroad making an initial application to enter the United States are subject to exclu-
sion as are noncitizens who entered the United States lawfully and have lived here for many 
years so long as they have not been admitted as permanent residents. 
17 The Supreme Court has, at least once, recognized my distinction between expulsion and 
exclusion as the critical dividing line in assessing the constitutional rights of noncitizens. See 
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I utilize these categories to analyze the nature of removal proceedings 
for two independent reasons. First, these categories are necessary to resolve 
otherwise conflicting indicators in the historical evidence and in the current 
doctrine. In other words, I draw this line because this is where the relevant 
history has drawn the line between civil and criminal proceedings 18 and be-
cause the factors relied upon in the current Supreme Court test to determine 
the civil or criminal nature of a proceeding provide clear guidance along this 
same dividing line. 19 I recognize that this rationale is somewhat circular: the 
evidence supports my categories because the categories are drawn from the 
evidence. This does not, however, undermine the utility of this division in 
making the criminal/civil assessment. 
Second, I draw the exclusion/expulsion line because it is a principled 
distinction upon which to grant some noncitizens greater rights than others 
and to impose the correlative restrictions upon government authority in some 
situations but not others. The well-founded recognition of permanent re-
sidents, and their precursor, denizens,20 as "citizens" of a lesser status hold-
ing rights superior to other noncitizens justifies greater protection for this 
class of noncitizens.21 Permanent residents, as a class, have the greatest eco-
nomic and familial connections and political allegiance to the United 
States.22 Functionally, the nature of the government's interests in the two 
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596, 600-01 (1953) (holding that the old statutory 
division between deportation and exclusion was not the critical constitutional dividing line and 
instead holding that permanent residents maintain their favored constitutional status even when 
seeking entry). 
18 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
19 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
20 As Sir William Blackstone described, "[a] denizen is an alien born, but who has ob-
tained [ ] by gift of the king letters patent [to make him an English subject] .... A denizen is 
in a kind of middle state, between an alien and a natural born subject, and partakes of both of 
them." I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 632; see also William McKay Bennett, 
Reentering The Golden Door: Waiving Goodbye To Exclusion Grounds For Permanent Resi-
dent Aliens, 69 WASH. L. REv. 1073, 1095 (1994) (analogizing permanent residents to 
denizens). 
21 See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-34 (1982) (applying due process rights to 
permanent residents returning from abroad although no such rights are applicable to other 
noncitizens); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82-83 (1976) (conferring greater rights upon 
noncitizens who had become lawful permanent residents); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 
763, 770 (1950) (explaining that noncitizens acquire an "ascending scale of rights as [they] 
increase [their] identity with our society"); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 
736-37 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (arguing that expulsion of permanent residents is a 
criminal punishment because of their superior right to other noncitizens); see also T. ALEXAN-
DER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERI-
CAN CITIZENSHIP 147-48 (2002); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST 
STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CmZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 8-9 (2006); GERALD L. 
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL 
LAW 131-33 (1996). 
22 Permanent residents have duties and obligations to their communities, including but not 
limited to, paying truces and compulsory military service. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 
68, 81 n.14 (1979) ("[R]esident aliens pay truces, serve in the Armed Forces, and have made 
significant contributions to our country in private and public endeavors."); see also Kevin R. 
Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immi-
gration Law and Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REv. 1139, 1219 (1993); Charles E. Roh, Jr. & 
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proceedings mitigates in favor of greater discretion in exclusion than in ex-
pulsion. The power to exclude is derived, at least in part, from the power to 
defend against aggression from abroad.23 It is principally an outward-looking 
power through which a democratic government maintains self-determination 
over changes in the composition of the American society and the American 
polity.24 The need for defense from outside aggression and self-determina-
tion justify the greater power of the government in the exclusion realm. Ex-
pulsion, by contrast, is principally a tool to protect against dangers from 
within society. The central purpose of expulsion is to incapacitate permanent 
residents who pose a danger to society. 25 This is the function that criminal 
law has always played and there is no reason that the limits on government 
power in this realm will inhibit its ability to provide this protection in the 
expulsion context.26 
Based on current Supreme Court doctrine designating all removal pro-
ceedings as civil, the full panoply of procedural rights inherent in criminal 
proceedings have not been extended to noncitizens in either type of removal 
proceeding.27 For example, as a result of the civil designation of removal 
Frank K. Upham, Comment, The Status of Aliens Under United States Draft Laws, 13 HARV. 
INT'L L.J. 501, 508-09 (1972) (discussing application of military draft to LPRs). As of Decem-
ber 2004 there were 69,299 foreign-born individuals serving in the military, roughly fifty-
seven percent of whom were naturalized citizens, while the remaining forty-three percent were 
not U.S. citizens. Margaret D. Stock, Essential to the Fight: Immigrants in the Military, Five 
Years after 9/11, 5 IMMIGR. PoL'Y IN Focus, Nov. 2006, at I, available at http://www.immi-
grationpolicy.org/images/file/infocus/lmmigrants_in_the_military_stock_PDF.pdf. Of course, 
not all permanent residents have greater connections to the United States than all non-LPRs. 
Many undocumented immigrants who have lived in the United States for many years have 
connections that run much deeper than, for example, a permanent resident who only recently 
arrived. However, as discussed infra notes 238-239 and accompanying text, a civil or criminal 
classification cannot be reassessed in every individual case. We must predetermine at the out-
set which categories of proceedings are civil and which are criminal. Thus, we must consider 
how permanent residents as a class compare to other noncitizens. 
23 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S . 580,587 (1952) (locating power to deport as a 
part of war powers). 
24 See MoTOMURA, supra note 21 at 8-9 (explaining the concept of permanent residents as 
intending citizens). 
25 In Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, the Court explained that limiting the government's 
removal power over permanent residents "does not leave an unprotected spot in the Nation's 
armor. Before petitioner's admission to permanent residence, he was required to satisfy the 
Attorney General and Congress of his suitability for that status." 344 U.S. 590, 602 (1953). 
26 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695-96 (2001) (recognizing that treatment of nonci-
tizens within the United States does not implicate the need to "control entry into the United 
States" and, therefore, limits on governmental power over noncitizens within the nation "leave 
no 'unprotected spot in the Nation's armor"' (quoting Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 602)). 
27 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) ("Consistent with the civil nature 
of the proceeding, various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply 
in a deportation hearing."); see, e.g., Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594 (holding that the Ex Post 
Facto Clause does not apply to removal proceedings); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 
(1912) (holding that proceedings to enforce immigration regulations do not involve Sixth 
Amendment protections); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912) (holding 
revocation of fraudulently obtained citizenship does not require ex post facto protection); Rmg 
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (holding that the right to a jury trial and the 
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures, and cruel and unusual punishments 
have no application in deportation cases); Orehhova v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2005) 
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proceedings, Congress has been permitted to broaden the expulsion grounds 
to retroactively encompass decades-old minor criminal convictions without 
running afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause, even when such convictions, 
when obtained, had no immigration consequences whatsoever.28 Thus, even 
if a defendant pled guilty years ago in reliance on then correct advice that 
she would suffer no immigration consequences, this would not protect her 
from removal today based on subsequent changes in the federal immigration 
laws.29 In addition, because of the civil label, respondents in removal cases 
have no right to appointed counsel and are therefore often left unaided to 
contend with what the Second Circuit has described as the "labyrinthine 
character of modern immigration law-a maze of hyper-technical statutes 
and regulations that engender waste, delay, and confusion for the Govern-
ment and petitioners alike."30 The inapplicability of these and other criminal 
procedural protections to removal proceedings is the most significant conse-
quence of the civil label. 
The relative lack of procedural protections in removal proceedings is, at 
times, disturbingly counterintuitive. The deprivation of liberty from a crimi-
nal conviction can pale in comparison to the liberty interest at stake in the 
(holding there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in removal proceedings); United States 
v. Perez, 330 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2003) ("As deportation proceedings are civil in nature, 
aliens in such proceedings are not protected by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."); 
Briseno v. INS, 192 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that Eighth Amendment protec-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment is inapplicable in removal proceedings because they 
are civil); Jolfa v. INS, 76 F.3d 386 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that prohibition against double 
jeopardy does not apply to removal proceedings because deportation is not punishment); Bus-
tos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1056-57 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that Miranda warnings are 
not required in deportation proceedings) ; Rubio De Cachu v. INS, 568 F.2d 625, 627-28 (9th 
Cir. 1977) (noting that since deportation is a civil rather than a criminal proceeding, a deporta-
tion provision cannot be characterized as a "bill of attainder"); Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 
397, 402 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that failure to give Miranda warnings during custodial inter-
rogation does not render statement inadmissible in civil removal proceedings). See generally 
Developments in the Law - Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REv. 
1370, 1385 (1983) (enumerating the various ways in which "the government affords fewer 
procedural rights to aliens facing deportation than to criminal defendants"). But cf Yamataya 
v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903) (holding that noncitizens do get procedural due process 
protection in deportation proceedings). 
28 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 
104-132, I 10 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 28, 40, 42, 
50 U.S.C.); IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3009-546 
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that the retroactive application of the IIRIRA did not violate the Ex Post 
Facto Clause because removal was a civil action); Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 557 (3d Cir. 
2002) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to deportation statutes and that the 
IIRIRA applies retroactively); Aragon-Ayon v. INS, 206 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 
expansion of the definition of "aggravated felony" under the IIRIRA could be applied retroac-
tively so as to render deportable an alien who pied guilty to an offense that was not an "aggra-
vated felony" at the time of the plea). But cf INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315-16 (2001) 
(noting that a law may not be applied retroactively absent a clear indication by Congress that it 
intended such result). 
29 See generally Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due 
Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 97 (1998). 
30 Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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removal proceeding that the conviction triggers. For example, a lawful per-
manent resident who is convicted of a misdemeanor marijuana offense may 
be sentenced to only a few days in jail. 31 However, once in removal proceed-
ings, federal law requires that the same permanent resident be subject to 
mandatory detention32 for the months or years it takes to complete the subse-
quent immigration case. She then may be permanently exiled from her 
home, livelihood, and family in the United States. The Supreme Court has 
compared this deprivation to a "loss of all that makes life worth living."33 
The unsettling imbalance between the grave liberty interests at stake in 
removal proceedings and the relative dearth of procedural protections attach-
ing thereto has sparked pointed criticism of the civil label. This criticism 
began from the moment the civil label was first invoked. Justice Brewer, 
writing in dissent in Fong Yue Ting, urged: 
But it needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition 
that deportation is punishment. Every one knows that to be forci-
bly taken away from home and family and friends and business 
and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punish-
ment, and that oftentimes most severe and cruel. 34 
Over the years, Justice Brewer's words have been echoed many times 
by other judges, all of whom either found themselves in the minority of their 
court35 or, notwithstanding their own analysis, felt bound by the principle of 
stare decisis. 36 
31 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 221.10 (2000) (classifying criminal possession of mari-
juana in the fifth degree as a B misdemeanor); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 70.15(2) (authorizing a 
sentence of up to three months for B misdemeanors). Notwithstanding the statutory maximum, 
people convicted of misdemeanor possession of marijuana usually serve no more than a few 
days, if they are incarcerated at all. 
32 See INA § 236(c)(l)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(l)(B) (2000); INA § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231 (a)(2) (2000). 
33 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S . 135, 147 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ng 
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
34 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
35 See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 , 497 (1999) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (asserting that it "cannot be doubted" that "deportation is a pen-
alty-at times a most serious one") (quoting Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154); Jordan v. De George, 
341 U.S. 223,243 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that while deportation proceedings 
"technically are not criminal," deportation is a "savage penalty" and functionally "a life sen-
tence of exile"); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 744-61 (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing emphati-
cally that deportation is punishment); Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1526-31 (3d Cir. 
1996) (Sarokin, J., concurring) (characterizing the Supreme Court's longstanding precedent 
that deportation is civil as "unrealistic" and arguing that the Supreme Court should "wipe the 
slate clean and admit to the long evident reality that deportation is punishment"). 
36 See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (recognizing that "since the intrin-
sic consequences of deportation are so close to punishment for crime, it might fairly be said 
also that the ex post facto Clause, even though applicable only to punitive legislation, should 
be applied to deportation" but ultimately adhering to precedent and upholding the removal 
order); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (calling the conclusion that de-
portation is a civil matter "debatable" but refusing to reconsider the settled law); Yepes-Prado 
v. INS, IO F.3d 1363, 1369 n.11 (9th Cir. 1993) (characterizing deportation as punishment but 
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Scholarly criticisms of the civil designation and arguments in favor of 
the recharacterization of removal proceedings as criminal, or at least quasi-
criminal, in nature have also persisted with surprising doggedness.37 The ar-
guments in favor of such reconceptualization have taken many forms. Some 
critics have argued that recent changes in the immigration laws, making re-
moval a more automatic consequence of many criminal convictions, have 
fundamentally transformed the nature of such proceedings.38 Others have ar-
gued that modem Supreme Court jurisprudence defining the boundaries of 
the civil-criminal divide requires a recharacterization of removal proceed-
ings as criminal.39 At least one scholar has advanced the position that the 
characterization of removal proceedings as civil was flawed from the outset 
because it failed to take account of the historically pervasive use of banish-
ment as criminal punishment.40 Still others, like Justice Brewer, appeal to a 
commonsense understanding of the nature of punishment.41 Despite the per-
noting that the court is bound by Supreme Court precedent declaring deportation to be civil); 
Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that "[t]he deportation pro-
ceeding, despite the severe consequences, has consistently been classified as civil , rather than a 
criminal matter"); United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630, 630 (2d Cir. I 926) (L. 
Hand, J.) (noting that "deportation is to [Klonis] exile, a dreadful punishment, abandoned by 
the common consent of all civilized peoples"); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law 
After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 564-76 (1990) (giving a thorough explanation of how courts' discom-
fort with their inability to apply standard constitutional scrutiny to removal cases has led them 
to use "phantom" constitutional norms to render purportedly subconstitutional decisions in 
favor of respondents); cf Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 98 (1958) (characterizing the rule that 
deportation is not penal as "highly fictional"). But see United States v. Soueiti, 154 F.3d 1018, 
1019 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that deportation is a criminal punishment when it is ordered, 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(l), by a federal judge sentencing a defendant for a criminal 
conviction). 
37 See, e.g., Javier Bleichmar, Deportation As Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the 
British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEo. IM-
1111GR. L.J. 115, 116 ( 1999); Austin T. Fragomen, The "Uncivil" Nature of Deportation: Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment Rights and the Exclusionary Rule, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 29, 34-35 (1978); 
Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why 
Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1893-94 (2000); Robert Pauw, A New 
laok at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution's Criminal Proce-
dure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 305,313 (2000); Michelle Rae Pinzon, Was 
the Supreme Court Right? A Closer Look at the True Nature of Removal Proceedings in the 
21st Century, 16 N.Y. INTL L. REv. 29, 32 (2003); Lupe S. Salinas, Deportations, Removals 
and the 1996 Immigration Acts: A Modern Look at the Ex Post Facto Clause, 22 B.U. INT'L 
L.J. 245, 261-73 (2004); Ethan Venner Torrey, "The Dignity of Crimes": Judicial Removal of 
Aliens and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 32 CowM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. I 87, I 88, 206 
(1999); Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1370, 1386 (1983). 
38 E.g., Bleichmar, supra note 37, at 118; Kanstroom, supra note 37, at 1891, 1893; Lisa 
Mendel, The Court's Failure to Recognize Deportation as Punishment: A Critical Analysis of 
Judicial Deference, 5 SuPFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. Aovoc. 205 (2000); Pauw, supra note 37; 
Gregory L. Ryan, Distinguishing Fong Yue Ting: Why the Inclusion of Perjury as an Aggra-
vated Felony Subjecting Legal Aliens to Deportation Under the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act Violates the Eighth Amendment, 28 ST. MAR Y's L.J. 989, IO I 0-12 (1997). 
39 E.g., Pinzon, supra note 37, at 62. 
40 E.g., Bleichmar, supra note 37, at 129, 134. 
41 E.g., Kanstroom, supra note 37, at 1894; Salinas, supra note 37, at 269-7 1. 
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sistence and breadth of the scholarly criticism, these arguments have not 
provoked meaningful inquiry from the judiciary. 
This article draws upon the important contributions of these critics to 
our evolving understanding of the nature of removal proceedings. Nonethe-
less, the critiques, like the decisions they criticize, suffer from one common 
and fatal flaw: they treat removal proceedings as monolithic and fail to ap-
preciate the critical distinction between exclusion and expulsion proceed-
ings. 42 As a result, past critiques, which examined removal proceedings as 
single entities, have been unable to reconcile the contradictory guidance pro-
vided by the Supreme Court's modem approach to determining the civil or 
criminal nature of given proceedings, the historical evidence regarding the 
Framers' conception of the nature of removal proceedings, and the founda-
tional justifications of the civil label relied upon by the Court. 
Part II of this article consists of a review of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence declaring the civil nature of removal proceedings.43 Part III explores 
the fundamental flaws in the Supreme Court's monolithic approach and ar-
gues that a bifurcated approach-with expulsion proceedings receiving a 
criminal label and exclusion proceedings receiving a civil label-is neces-
sary to understand the true nature of these proceedings. In this section, I 
investigate the nature of exclusion and expulsion proceedings through three 
distinct lenses: ( 1) an examination of the justification explicitly relied upon 
by the Court in its original application of the civil label; (2) an examination 
of the historical evidence of how the Framers conceived of such proceed-
ings; and (3) an application of the current Supreme Court doctrine delineat-
ing the civil-criminal divide.44 
Part IV assesses the practical implications of the bifurcated approach 
and demonstrates that criminal protections can apply in expulsion proceed-
ings without fundamentally undermining the government's interest in those 
42 One other author has suggested a need to move beyond the Court's monolithic approach 
but not by distinguishing between exclusion and expulsion. Rather, Daniel Kanstroom, in his 
essay Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws 
Make Bad Cases, supra note 37, argues that "social control" removal laws must be analyzed 
separately from "border control" removal laws. In this thoughtful work, Kanstroom concludes 
that removal proceedings sanctioning post-entry misbehavior are social control laws analogous 
to criminal law, and therefore, such proceedings should receive some protections analogous to 
criminal proceedings. Id. at 1897, 1907, 1935; see also Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation and 
Justice: A Constitutional Dialogue, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 771, 787 (2000). Kanstroom' s work is 
notable because it does not treat all removal proceedings as a single entity for the purpose of 
assessing their criminal or civil nature. While Kanstroom's distinction between social control 
and border control laws has significant appeal, I conclude the distinction is ultimately not 
supported by doctrine and history. Instead, the distinction between exclusion and expulsion is 
the critical dividing line. Moreover, I conclude, unlike Kanstroom, that expulsion proceedings 
are pure criminal proceedings-not simply analogous to criminal proceedings and therefore 
deserving of quasi-criminal treatment. I also endeavor herein to examine the practical implica-
tions of redesignating expulsion proceedings as criminal. In his article, Kanstroom sought to 
"reinvigorate the discussion of how best to understand the constitutional doctrine of deporta-
tion law." Kanstroom, supra note 37, at 1897. I hope in this article to answer that call. 
43 See discussion infra Part II. 
44 See discussion infra Part 111. 
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proceedings.45 Specifically, I explain how the protections of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the exclusionary rule 
and other federal evidentiary rules, and criminal due process venue require-
ments could be applied in the expulsion context. 
II. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE DECLARING THE CIVIL 
NATURE OF REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 
The purpose of this section is to set forth the development of the Su-
preme Court doctrine that I aim to critique. The focus, therefore, is on cases 
that grapple with the application of the civil or criminal label in the immigra-
tion context. The leading cases in this category were all heard in the final 
years of the nineteenth century. This review of precedent will focus on that 
period. 
The Supreme Court's first significant consideration of the scope and 
nature of the modern federal immigration powe~6 came in the 1889 Chinese 
Exclusion Case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States.47 It is remarkable to note 
at the outset that, in sharp contrast to the pervasive presence of immigration 
cases on the current federal docket,48 it took over 100 years of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence for the Court to make its first significant venture into 
this area of law.49 The case involved a Chinese national who had resided 
45 See discussion infra Part IV. 
46 Prior immigration cases arose as challenges to state attempts to regulate immigration 
and, in those cases, the Court located the federal power over immigration as derived princi-
pally from the Foreign Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); 
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 75 
(1875); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849). Chae Chan Ping was the first case in which the 
Supreme Court identified a free-standing federal immigration power. See generally Sarah H. 
Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth 
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. I, 106-12, 123-34 
(2002). 
47 130 U.S. 581 (1889); see also discussion infra note 49. 
48 In 2006, eighteen percent (11,911 out of 66,618) of appeals initiated in the United 
States Courts of Appeals were immigration removal cases. Jumc 1AL Bus1NESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, TABLE B-3 . U.S. COURTS OF AP-
PEALS-SOURCES OF APPEALS AND ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED, BY CIRCUIT, DURING 
THE 12-MoNTH PERIODS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 THROUGH 2006, available at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/appendices/b3.pdf (last visited Mar. I 3, 2008). In the Second 
Circuit the number was thirty-eight percent (2640 out of 7029), and in the Ninth Circuit, a full 
forty percent (5862 out of 14,636) of new appeals were immigration removal cases. Id. 
49 There were earlier cases that began to develop a notion of the federal government's 
immigration powers. These cases pertained primarily to the balance of power between the 
federal and state governments over the regulation of immigration. In New York v. Miln, a New 
York statute requiring that ships entering New York make a report of the passengers on board 
was upheld as being part of a state's police power and not a regulation of foreign commerce. 36 
U.S. 102, 161 (1837). In The Passenger Cases, New York's and Massachusetts ' taxes on in-
coming passengers were struck down as infringing upon the federal government's exclusive 
authority over immigration. 48 U.S. 283 (1849); see also Edye, 112 U.S. at 580; Henderson , 
92 U.S. at 259; Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 75. The Court had also previously issued some decisions 
pertaining to federal immigration matters, but those decisions failed to delve into the central 
issue of the nature of the government's immigration powers and the limits, if any, on Congres-
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lawfully in the United States for over a decade. In 1887, Chae Chan Ping left 
the United States in possession of a valid reentry permit. Slightly over a year 
later he embarked on his return to the United States on board a ship from 
Hong Kong. While en route, a new law driven by virulent anti-Chinese xen-
ophobia50 was enacted, which purported, inter alia, to annul reentry permits 
granted to Chinese nationals and forbid their reentry.51 When Chae Chan 
Ping arrived in the United States, he was not permitted to enter and was 
detained on the ship he arrived upon. He filed a habeas petition claiming that 
he was being de facto expelled, as opposed to excluded, from the United 
States pursuant to the new law, which violated "rights vested in [him] under 
the [prior] laws of congress,"52 his right to due process of law, and the 
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.53 
Announcing the unanimous decision of the Court, famously laced with 
overt anti-Asian racism, Justice Field declined to conceive of the case as an 
expulsion case and instead hung much of his analysis on the exclusion con-
text in which the case arose. 54 He ignored the due process and ex post facto 
claims and instead focused exclusively on the nature and scope of Con-
gress's power to exclude noncitizens. Field identified the immigration power, 
for the first time, as an inherent power incident to national sovereignty be-
cause, inter alia, the power was necessary to protect against the "aggression 
and encroachment . .. from vast hordes of [a foreign nation's] people 
crowding in upon us."55 While Field did not explicitly characterize the ex-
sional power. See, e.g., Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 560 (1884) (interpreting 
statute requiring reentry permits for Chinese laborers not to apply retroactively to Chinese 
national who departed before such permits were in existence); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 
124 U.S. 621,635 (1888) (holding that statute which stated that a reentry permit was the only 
competent proof of a Chinese national's right to reenter did not apply retroactively to Chinese 
laborer who left with such permit but lost it to pirates). 
50 Prior to the passage of the Scott Act, which tightened restrictions on Chinese immigra-
tion by barring the return of all Chinese laborers, anti-Chinese sentiment was strong through-
out the Western United States. MoTOMURA, supra note 21, at 15-16. When the transcontinental 
railroad was completed, some ten thousand Chinese workers were left unemployed, which 
depressed wages throughout the western states. Id. at 17. Chinese laborers who had been criti-
cal to the completion of the railroad were now viewed as unwelcome economic competition. 
Id. After a recession from 1873 to 1878, many in California and throughout the West blamed 
Chinese laborers for American joblessness. Id. The rising tide of anti-Chinese sentiment per-
vaded local politics in the West and seeped into national politics as well. Id.; see also Thomas 
E. Cavanagh, Political Representation and Stratified Pluralism, in IMMIGRATION AND RAcE: 
NEW CHALLENGES FOR AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 163, 186 (Gerald D. Jaynes ed., 2000) (noting 
that the presence of Chinese contract laborers during the 1860s stirred up tremendous resent-
ment from white laborers, prompting the passage of discriminatory laws by the California 
government beginning in 1872). 
51 See Supplemental Act of Oct. I, 1888, ch. I 064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888). 
52 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 589. 
53 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 722 (1893) (explaining petitioner's 
arguments in Chae Chan Ping). See generally Cleveland, supra note 46, at 123-34. 
54 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 594-96. Prior to his appointment to the Court, Justice 
Field had himself participated in xenophobic efforts to restrict Chinese immigration. Kan-
stroom, supra note 37, at 1905; see also Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 743 (Brewer, J., dissent-
ing) (referring to "obnoxious Chinese"). 
55 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606. 
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clusion in this case as a civil action, his omission of any discussion of the 
petitioner's ex post facto claim, which would have had obvious merit if ex-
clusion were a criminal punishment,56 is a strong indication that the Court's 
analysis contained an implicit judgment that exclusion proceedings were 
civil. Chae Chan Ping marked the birth of the modem plenary powers doc-
trine in immigration law. 57 
In the years immediately following its decision in Chae Chan Ping, the 
Court began to sketch out the boundaries of Congress's immigration power 
as pertaining to "[t]he supervision of the admission of aliens into the United 
States."58 In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, the Court upheld a law prohib-
iting the courts from reviewing the Executive's fact-finding in support of an 
exclusion determination. 59 In so holding, the Court relied on the "maxim of 
international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in 
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of for-
eigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon 
such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe."6() It found textual recognition 
of this inherent power in the Constitution's delegation of international rela-
tions powers to the political branches to regulate foreign commerce, includ-
ing the "entrance of ships," the "importation of goods," and the "bringing 
of persons into the ports of the United States."61 This provides some evi-
dence that, initially, the Court conceived of the immigration power as per-
taining to the admission of people into the country and did not perceive it as 
pertaining to their expulsion. 
That same year, the Court issued another decision, which, while on its 
face dealt only with statutory interpretation, again hinted at a limitation on 
Congress's power to regulate persons already admitted to the United States 
as permanent residents.62 This case, Lau Ow Bew v. United States, involved a 
statute requiring merchants from China to present a certificate issued by 
56 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1789) (establishing that the Ex Post Facto Clause 
applies to retroactive changes in criminal punishment). 
57 The plenary powers doctrine is the principle that restricts the judiciary from applying 
constitutional scrutiny to the substantive provisions of immigration law. See infra note 118 and 
accompanying text. There is considerable debate about whether the plenary powers doctrine is 
properly understood as a doctrine of deference to the political branches based on a theory of 
institutional competence (akin to the political question doctrine) or whether it is a more radical 
tenet that the political branches are unconstrained by the Constitution in their substantive im-
migration decisions. See generally ALEINIKOFF, supra note 21, at 154-74. For the purposes of 
this Article, it is not necessary to enter this debate. 
58 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (emphasis added). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 659 (emphasis added). 
6 1 Id. (emphasis added). The Court also identified aspects of this power in the naturaliza-
tion clause, id., which pertains explicitly to the decision of who to allow to enter the national 
community, and the war powers provisions, id., presumably insofar as they relate to the power 
to protect against the "aggression and encroachment" of foreign invaders. See also Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S . 581 , 606 (1889). These provisions similarly appear to be 
related to the power to prevent or invite entry into this country, not the power to expel people 
from within. 
62 Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47 (1892). 
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China in order to enter the United States. A unanimous Court held that the 
requirement did not pertain to Chinese nationals who were permanent re-
sidents of the United States.63 Just a year earlier, however, the Court had held 
that the same statute was clear and unambiguous and applied to "every Chi-
nese person."64 These conflicting interpretations of the same statute appeared 
to evince a discomfort in the Court with congressional assertions of unlim-
ited power over persons who the United States had already admitted into the 
national community.65 Thus, in the few years immediately following the Chi-
nese Exclusion Case, the Court appeared to be focused on the power to ex-
clude, not expel, as the key component of the sovereign immigration power. 
A year later, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Court at last 
squarely faced the question of whether the Constitution requires criminal 
protections for noncitizen permanent residents facing expulsion.66 Fong Yue 
Ting involved three noncitizen residents of the United States who were fac-
ing expulsion under an 1892 law that required all Chinese residents of the 
United States to register and obtain certificates attesting to their right to re-
side in the United States.67 The law provided for the expulsion, through judi-
cial determination, of any Chinese resident who failed to obtain such 
certificates without good cause.68 The law explicitly placed the burden of 
proof on the Chinese resident in such proceedings and required that such 
burden could only be satisfied with the testimony of "at least one credible 
white witness."69 In upholding the constitutionality of the law, the Court 
explicitly declared that the criminal constitutional protections, including 
"the provisions of the constitution, securing the right of trial by jury, and 
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and cruel and unusual pun-
63 Id. The Court referred to the petitioner in this case as a person "domiciled" in the 
United States, but the treaty under which the petitioner was admitted specifically permitted the 
entrance of Chinese nationals to the United States as "permanent residents." Id. at 49 (citing 
Burlingame Treaty, U.S.-China, July 28, 1868, 16 St. 739). Thus, while no individualized de-
tennination was previously made by the United States to admit the petitioner as a permanent 
resident, the affirmative decision was made as to a class of persons including the petitioner. In 
later cases the Court explicitly referred to persons in the petitioner's situation as "resident 
aliens." fung Yue ling v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 734 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
64 Wan Shing v. United States, 140 U.S. 424, 426 (1891) (emphasis added). 
65 This discomfort was expressed by reference to the "general [principle of] international 
law, [that] foreigners who have become domiciled in a country other than their own acquire 
rights and must discharge duties in many respects the same as possessed by and imposed upon 
the citizens of that country." Lau Ow Bew, 144 U.S . at 61-62. But cf Chae Chan Ping, 130 
U.S. at 609 (applying explicit retroactive exclusion law to Chinese laborer who had lived in 
the United States for twelve years and was abroad for sixteen months). 
66 149 U.S. at 698. 
67 Chinese Deportation Act of May 6, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 . 
6s Id. 
69 Id. § 6. Interestingly, the statute explicitly provided that the unlawful presence of non-
permanent residents was a crime and that deportation in those instances would be enacted as 
punishment for criminal conviction. See id. §§ 2, 4; see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 
U.S. 228 (1896). Thus, counterintuitively, non-permanent residents facing deportation under 
the statute received the enhanced protections inherent in criminal law, but the long-term per-
manent residents, whom the government affirmatively invited into the United States, did not. 
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ishments, have no application."70 The majority's reasoning relied upon its 
assertion that leading international law commentators had identified the right 
to expel foreigners as an inherent component of sovereign power and upon 
the historical claim that other countries, most importantly England, had as-
serted through legislative enactments the right to expel foreigners. 71 The dis-
sents offered a conflicting account of the history and scholarship.72 
What had previously appeared to be discomfort with congressional as-
sertions of unlimited authority to expel permanent residents now displayed 
itself as a fracture in the Court. The six-Justice majority held that Congress's 
plenary powers over exclusion proceedings extended with equal force to the 
expulsion context.73 In so holding, the Court, for the first time, explicitly 
applied the civil label to expulsion, as well as exclusion.74 Three Justices, 
including the authors of the Chae Chan Ping and Lau Ow Bew decisions, 
dissented vigorously and at length, arguing that expulsion, unlike exclusion, 
is a criminal punishment that must be accompanied by the appropriate con-
stitutional protections. 75 
The majority's focus on explaining that the power to expel was a power 
inherent in sovereignty was, however, misplaced. Neither the dissent nor the 
petitioner contested the fact that the national government possessed the 
power to expel. The dispute instead was over the nature of that power: 
whether the power was civil or criminal. On this issue, the Court summarily 
concluded, without citation to authority, that expulsion was distinct from the 
acknowledged criminal punishment of transportation-the expulsion from a 
country as punishment for a crime-and that "[t]he power to exclude 
aliens, and the power to expel them, rest upon one foundation, are derived 
from one source, are supported by the same reasons, and are in truth but 
parts of one and the same power. "76 
The two leading dissents in Fong Yue Ting approached the issue from 
opposite perspectives. 77 Justice Brewer conceived of the case as about the 
rights of noncitizen residents, whom he characterized as "denizens" who 
7° Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S . at 730. 
7 1 Id. at 707-09. 
72 Id. at 756-57 (Field, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. 
73 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) ("The right of a nation to 
expel or deport foreigners , who have not been naturalized or taken any steps towards becom-
ing citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as 
the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country."). 
74 Id. at 730 ("The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime."). 
75 Id. at 740 (Brewer, J., dissenting) ("Deportation is punishment."); id. at 758-59 (Field, 
J., dissenting) ("His deportation is thus imposed for neglect to obtain a certificate of residence, 
from which he can only escape by showing his inability to secure it from one of the causes 
named. That is the punishment for his neglect, and that ... can only be imposed after indict-
ment, trial , and conviction."); id. at 763 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) ("As to them, registration for 
the purpose of identification is required, and the deportation denounced for failure to do so is 
by way of punishment to coerce compliance with that requisition. No euphuism can disguise 
the character of the act in this regard."). 
76 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709, 713 (1893) (majority opinion). 
77 The third dissent was by Chief Justice Fuller, who argued that the Act: 
2008) Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide 303 
"occupy a middle state between an alien and a native."78 Justice Brewer 
equated expulsion with the criminal punishments of transportation or banish-
ment and concluded that denizens may not be subject to such punishment 
without the application of full constitutional criminal protections.79 
Justice Field conceived of the case as being about the limits of Con-
gress's immigration power. Having authored the decision in Chae Chan 
Ping, Justice Field focused his dissent on drawing a line that distinguished 
the power to exclude, in Chae Chan Ping, from the power to expel at issue 
in Fong Yue Ting. Field asserted that, apart from the Alien and Sedition Acts 
of 1798 which he characterized as "universal[ly] condemn[ed]," never 
before had the government asserted the authority to expel noncitizen re-
sidents other than as punishment for a crime or as an act of war.80 
Fong Yue Ting remains both the first and last word on the civil nature of 
removal proceedings. In the century since Fong Yue Ting, the Court has 
never revisited its substantive inquiry into this issue. 
In the final years of the nineteenth century and into the early part of the 
twentieth, the Court relied upon the civil label, at least in part, to expand the 
power of the political branches in the realm of immigration.81 During this 
period, the Court repeatedly refused to reopen the inquiry into whether re-
moval proceedings were civil or criminal in nature and explicitly rejected 
attempts to distinguish Fong Yue Ting, even in situations where expulsion 
was triggered by a violation of a criminal law. 82 The Court did establish 
some outer boundaries of Congress's power over immigrants83 but never 
called into question the ultimate holding of Fong Yue Ting. For example, in 
Wong Wing v. United States, the Supreme Court held that noncitizens subject 
to criminal punishment are entitled to full constitutional criminal protec-
tions. 84 In The Japanese Immigrant Case,85 the Court held that persons in 
directs the performance of a judicial function in a particular way, and inflicts punish-
ment without a judicial trial. ... It is, in effect, a legislative sentence of banishment, 
and, as such, absolutely void. Moreover, it contains within it the germs of the asser-
tion of an unlimited and arbitrary power, in general, incompatible with the immuta-
ble principles of justice, inconsistent with the nature of our government, and in 
conflict with the written Constitution by which that government was created and 
those principles secured. 
Id. at 763 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). 
18 Id. at 736 (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
19 Id. at 736-41. 
80 Id. at 750 (Field, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 225-228 and accompanying text. 
81 See, e.g. , Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912) (relying in part on 
civil label to permit the retroactive application of a law providing for the cancellation of fraud-
ulently obtained naturalization certificates); see also Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 
U.S. 538, 546-47 (1895) (relying in part on civil label to uphold jurisdiction-stripping provi-
sions that insulated executive action in the immigration arena from judicial review). 
82 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S . 32, 39 (1924); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 
(1913). 
83 See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1922) (deporting persons with non-
frivolous claim to United States citizenship requires a judicial, not merely administrative, de-
termination); see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896). 
84 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
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expulsion proceedings, unlike persons in exclusion proceedings, are entitled 
to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment-creating significant ten-
sion with the original rationale of Fong Yue Ting that exclusion and expul-
sion were two sides of the same coin. 
Toward the middle of the twentieth century, the Court began to express 
some discomfort with the sometimes harsh consequences of the civil label in 
expulsion proceedings. During this period the Court repeatedly reversed ex-
pulsion orders, purportedly on statutory interpretation grounds. 86 In each in-
stance, however, it displayed discomfort by noting that expulsion was a 
"drastic measure,"87 by drawing attention to the "high and momentous"88 
stakes in expulsion proceedings, or by characterizing as a "great hardship"89 
the impact of an expulsion order.90 At times, the Court was explicit about its 
uneasiness with the civil label. It held that the criminal "void for vagueness 
doctrine" would be applied to deportation statutes because of the "grave 
nature of deportation."91 It also mused that, if it "were writing on a clean 
slate[,] ... it might fairly be also said that the ex post facto Clause, even 
though applicable only to punitive legislation, should be applied to deporta-
tion. "92 Despite some dissenting voices,93 the Court always stopped short of 
undertaking a substantive reexamination of the civil label applied to removal 
proceedings. 94 
85 Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
86 See also Motomura, supra note 36 at 549 (explaining the Court's use of sometimes 
strained statutory interpretation of immigration statutes to fill the void of minimal constitu-
tional oversight created by the plenary powers doctrine). 
87 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). 
88 Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947). 
89 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945). 
90 See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 598-99 (1953) (interpreting the statu-
tory term "excludable" in a regulation as having no application to legal permanent residents, 
since such a reading would have been questionable given "a resident alien's constitutional 
right to due process"); Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 6 (reversing permanent resident' s deporta-
tion order by interpreting "sentenced more than once" to mean two separate prosecutions); 
Delgadillo, 332 U.S. at 388 (reversing long-time noncitizen resident's order of deportation by 
interpreting "entry" not to include return from foreign soil after being rescued to that land 
from a ship that was torpedoed); Bridges, 326 U.S . at 135 (overturning deportation order based 
on agency's incorrect interpretation of law providing for deportation of aliens "affiliated" with 
Communist Party). 
91 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951). 
92 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954). 
93 See, e.g., United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 178 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
Justice Jackson stated: 
Administrative determinations of liability to deportation have been sustained as con-
stitutional only by considering them to be exclusively civil in nature, with no crimi-
nal consequences or connotations. That doctrine, early adopted against sharp dissent 
has been adhered to with increasing logical difficulty as new causes for deportation, 
based not on illegal entry but on conduct after admittance, have been added, and the 
period within which deportation proceedings may be instituted has been extended. 
Id.; De George, 341 U.S. at 232 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (referring to deportation based on a 
criminal conviction as an additional "punish[ment] with a life sentence of banishment"). 
94 Notably, during this period the cases that troubled the Court most consistently involved 
the expulsion of noncitizen residents. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) 
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The Court came closest to such reexamination in 1952 when it decided 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy. 95 In Harisiades, the Court was asked to decide 
whether Congress was empowered to retroactively apply a law providing for 
the deportation of long-term legal permanent residents who had been mem-
bers of the Communist Party notwithstanding the fact that their membership 
had terminated before the law's passage. The petitioners argued: (1) that 
Congress's power to expel permanent residents was subject to at least ra-
tional basis review by the federal courts; and (2) that the new law, as applied 
to them, violated the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws.96 De-
spite recognizing that the first claim was "not founded in precedents of this 
Court,"97 the Court went on to discuss the source and extent of congressional 
authority over immigration. It described the source of Congress's immigra-
tion power as principally derived from the war powers.98 "That aliens remain 
vulnerable to expulsion after long residence is a practice that bristles with 
severities. But it is a weapon of defense and reprisal confirmed by interna-
tional law as a power inherent in every sovereign state."99 Accordingly, the 
Court reaffirmed its prior holdings that "[s]uch matters are so exclusively 
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune 
from judicial inquiry or interference."100 In regard to the Ex Post Facto 
Clause argument, the Court called the civil designation of deportation "de-
batable" but refused to reconsider this settled aspect of law. 101 Accordingly, 
the Court refused to apply the criminal Ex Post Facto Clause to the deporta-
tion statute at issue. 102 
Through the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the Court seemed repeatedly 
troubled by the harsh application of the civil label to lawful permanent re-
sidents, particularly in deportation proceedings, but at ease with this label in 
("[O]nce an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop ties that go with 
permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly."); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 
U.S. 449, 462 (1963) (noting an "innocent, casual, and brief excursion" by a noncitizen resi-
dent outside this country's borders does not subject him to the consequences of an "entry" 
upon his return); Delgadillo, 332 U.S. at 388 (holding noncitizen resident not subject to depor-
tation when he did not voluntarily leave and reenter the United States). In contrast, during this 
same period the Court permitted the summary exclusion of other noncitizens without a hearing, 
holding that the "exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty" and that 
"[w]hatever the rule may be concerning deportation of persons who have gained entry into the 
United States, it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to 
review the determination of the political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien." 
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-53 (1950). 
95 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
96 Id. at 584, 593. The petitioners also argued that the law violated the First Amendment. 
Id. at 591-92. 
97 Id. at 585. 
98 Id. at 587-88. 
99 Id. 
wo Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,589 (1952). 
wi Id. at 594. 
102 Id. at 594-95 . But see id. at 598, 600 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (calling deportation a 
punishment through banishment and a deprivation of "all that makes life worth while" and 
arguing that Fong Yue Ting should be overruled). 
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the exclusion context, particularly when the respondent was not a permanent 
resident. 103 In fact, the status of the respondent seemed at times more deter-
minative than the status of the proceedings. 104 However, notwithstanding the 
Court's apparent discomfort with the civil label, it never undertook a sub-
stantive reevaluation of that label. 
In the final decades of the twentieth century, as the Rehnquist Court 
began to confront the civil designation of removal proceedings, all apparent 
discomfort with that label seemed to vanish from the Court's opinions. 105 
Most recently, the Court has seemed uninterested in undertaking a substan-
tive inquiry into the sources of the powers to exclude and expel. It has noted 
a number of sources of constitutional authority pertaining to immigration 
generally, including the naturalization powers, the foreign relations powers, 
and the war powers. 106 The Court, however, has not independently articu-
lated the relevance of these constitutional powers to the expulsion and exclu-
sion powers individually. The Court's recent pronouncements are therefore 
of limited utility in assessing the civil or criminal nature of exclusion and 
expulsion. 
Thus, through more than 200 years of constitutional history, Fong Yue 
Ting remains the only case in which the Supreme Court has undertaken a 
serious inquiry into the civil or criminal nature of removal proceedings. That 
decision rested on contested historical evidence and upon an assertion, un-
supported by any authority, that the power to exclude noncitizens and the 
103 Compare Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 (1976) ("We do not agree .. . 
that the federal power over aliens is so plenary that any agent of the National Government may 
arbitrarily subject all resident aliens to different substantive rules from those applied to citi-
zens."), and Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590,596 n.5 (1953) (construing immigra-
tion regulation permitting exclusion of aliens based on secret evidence inapplicable to a 
returning permanent resident alien because of the substantial constitutional concerns that such 
an application would present), with Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (uphold-
ing denial of temporary visa to non-permanent resident and sustaining Congress' s "plenary 
power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those char-
acteristics which Congress has forbidden") (quoting Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 
(1967)), and Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 123 (upholding law excluding homosexuals based on Con-
gress's plenary power over admission and exclusion of aliens). See also supra note 94 and 
accompanying text; Morawetz, supra note 29, at 125 n.122 (discussing in general that the 
terminology of "plenary power" has rarely arisen in cases involving long term permanent 
residents). 
104 See supra notes 94, 103 and accompanying text. 
105 See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 , 491 (1999) 
(explaining that deportation is not punishment because the noncitizen is "merely being held to 
the terms under which he was admitted"); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 
(1984) (holding that deportation is a "purely civil action" and refusing to apply the exclusion-
ary rule to such proceedings). 
"
16 See, e.g. , Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (" '[A]ny policy toward aliens is 
vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of 
foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government.'") 
(quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976)); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 
(1982) (locating the immigration power in, inter alia, the naturalization clause and the foreign 
commerce clause as well as the "broad authority over foreign affairs"). 
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power to expel noncitizens are one and the same. 107 Moreover, because the 
Court has declined every subsequent invitation to reexamine that holding, it 
has never had the opportunity to apply its modern view of the civil-criminal 
divide in the immigration context. 
III. A BIFURCATED ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMINAL OR CIVIL 
NATURE OF REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 
The majority's pronouncement in Fong Yue Ting that "[t]he power to 
exclude aliens and the power to expel them rest upon one foundation, are 
derived from one source, are supported by the same reasons, and are in truth 
but parts of one and the same power"108 is the birth of what I call the Court's 
monolithic approach to removal proceedings. It is this statement that con-
flates the analysis of the civil or criminal nature of exclusion with the analy-
sis of the civil or criminal nature of expulsion and obviates, for the Court, 
the need to independently justify the application of the civil label to each 
action. Because the Court believes that exclusion and expulsion are two 
sides of the same coin, any evidence that exclusion is civil in nature applies 
with equal force to expulsion. The majority made this pronouncement in 
Fong Yue Ting in the face of vigorous dissents and without citation to a 
single source of authority. It is this unsupported pronouncement, the validity 
of which the Court has never reexamined, that I propose is the Court's funda-
mental error. 
In this section, I seek to reexamine the civil designation of removal 
proceedings and to subject the Court's monolithic approach to rigorous scru-
tiny. This Article uses three lenses to examine the nature of removal pro-
ceedings: (1) an examination of the rationale of the Court in Fong Yue Ting 
on its own terms-assessing the merits of the Court's claim that exclusion 
and expulsion are civil because they are part of the same extra-constitutional 
power inherent in sovereignty; (2) an historical analysis; and (3) an applica-
tion of the Supreme Court's current test for evaluating the civil or criminal 
nature of proceedings. I conclude that each of these lenses reveals a flaw in 
the monolithic approach, and each instead supports a bifurcated approach to 
understanding the true nature of removal proceedings in which exclusion 
and expulsion are viewed separately. Collectively, the view through these 
three lenses reveals that removal proceedings straddle the civil-criminal di-
vide, with exclusion falling on the civil side and expulsion on the criminal 
side. 
Each of these three lenses tells us something important and different 
about the nature of removal proceedings. First, an examination of the Court's 
claims about the nature and source of the powers to exclude and expel is 
critical because the Court's reasoning in Fong Yue Ting rests primarily upon 
107 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S . 698, 709, 713 (1893). 
108 See id. at 713. 
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its understanding of these powers. Moreover, since the Supreme Court has 
never undertaken a substantive reexamination of the issue in Fong Yue Ting, 
the justification presented therein remains the only clearly articulated ratio-
nale for the civil label that the Supreme Court has offered. I argue here that 
the Court misconstrued the nature and source of the power to expel because 
it failed to grapple with the division of authority among leading international 
law scholars and because it failed to adequately confront the possibility that 
the powers inherent in sovereignty had been limited by the Constitution. In 
addition, the Court's rationale has been roundly rejected by modern scholars, 
and the Supreme Court itself has demonstrated increasing discomfort with 
claims of extra-constitutional powers. 
Second, the historical analysis is important primarily because it informs 
our understanding of the Framers' intent. 109 Remembering what is ultimately 
at stake in the criminal or civil designation-the meaning of the constitu-
tional clauses imparting the enhanced protections in criminal proceedings-
makes this analysis of whether the Framers conceived of exclusion and/or 
expulsion as a criminal penalty relevant. The historical treatment of removal 
proceedings reveals that the models most likely to influence the Framers-
common-law England and colonial America-treated exclusion as a civil 
administrative matter but expulsion as a criminal penalty. 110 
Third, the modern civil/criminal test has never been used by the Su-
preme Court in the removal context. The test was developed in the latter half 
of the twentieth century, long after the Court pronounced all removal pro-
ceedings to be civil in Fong Yue Ting. I do not endeavor to critique this test. 
Instead, insofar as coherence and consistency are accepted virtues in a com-
mon-law system, I propose that application of the modern test is one impor-
tant indicator of the nature of exclusion and expulsion proceedings. When 
applied, the modern test also supports the claim that exclusion is a civil 
action but expulsion is a criminal punishment. 
109 See Bleichmar, supra note 37. Bleichmar presents a useful analysis of the historical use 
of transportation as a criminal punishment and its influence on the Framers' conception of the 
criminal or civil nature of removal. He argues that all removal orders are criminal in nature 
because they are analogous to the eighteenth century, widespread practice of transportation. Id. 
at 116. Building upon Bleichmar's analysis, I argue below that expulsion, but not exclusion, is 
the modem day equivalent of the criminal punishment of transportation. 
110 The Court in Fong Yue Ting recognized the relevance of a historical inquiry but asked 
the wrong historical question. 149 U.S. at 707. The Court focused on whether or not nations 
have historically had the power to expel or deport noncitizens. Id. at 707-11. No one was 
arguing that the United States lacked the power to expel or exclude. The real issue, which the 
Court sidestepped, was whether the powers of exclusion and/or expulsion had historically been 
criminal or civil. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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A. Ihe Supreme Court's Foundational Rationale for the Civil Label: 
Ihe Inherent Powers Theory 
The Constitution does not explicitly mention the power to exclude or 
expel noncitizens. As a result, the source and nature of the federal govern-
ment's authority to regulate immigration has been a subject of great debate 
from the earliest days of the Union. 111 In the years immediately preceding 
the Supreme Court's decision in Chae Chan Ping, the immigration powers 
were most commonly understood as a component of the powers delegated 
to Congress through the Foreign Commerce Clause.112 Chae Chan Ping 
marked the birth of what has become known as the "inherent powers the-
ory." As Justice Field explained the theory for the Court: 
That the government of the United States, through the action of the 
legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory, is a 
proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdic-
tion over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every 
independent nation. It is a part of its independence. 113 
In Fong Yue Ting, the Court extended the inherent powers theory from the 
exclusion context to the expulsion context. As the Court explained, "[t]he 
right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or 
upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, [is] an inherent and inalienable 
right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its 
independence, and its welfare."114 The assertion that the powers to exclude 
and expel are inalienable "has come to stand for the idea of immigration 
control as an unenumerated, or even extra-constitutional, power inherent in 
nationhood." 115 According to the Court, the civil label and the inapplicability 
of constitutional criminal procedural protections flowed naturally from the 
understanding of the immigration powers as inherent extra-constitutional 
powers.' 16 
111 See supra notes 46-48 and infra notes 224-227 and accompanying text. 
112 See Cleveland, supra note 46, at 81, 106-12. Cleveland provides an excellent and com-
prehensive historical examination of the origins of the doctrine of inherent powers over foreign 
affairs and the Supreme Court's ultimate ratification of that doctrine in its late nineteenth-
century decisions. 
11 3 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (emphasis added). 
114 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (emphasis added). 
115 NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 122. Notwithstanding this common understanding of the 
inherent powers theory, the decision in Fong Yue Ting itself docs not present a consistent 
picture of the relationship between the immigration powers and the Constitution. See, e.g., 
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 712 (referring to the immigration powers as "committed by the 
constitution" to the political branches of government); id. at 730 (referring to the immigration 
powers as "constitutional authority"). 
116 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 712-13. This logical leap is certainly ripe for scrutiny. See 
discussion infra Part III.A. I. 
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The inherent powers theory was therefore the underlying basis of the 
civil designation established in Fong Yue Ting. 117 Thus, an analysis of the 
inherent powers theory is the natural starting point to reassess the civil des-
ignation of immigration removal proceedings. An inquiry into the nature and 
source of the immigration powers is primarily valuable to test the merits of 
the Supreme Court's rationale. 118 
The Supreme Court's adoption of the inherent powers theory in Chae 
Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting was ostensibly b11sed upon its reading of the 
international law scholarship of the day. I will therefore begin by examining 
the authority explicitly relied upon by the Court. I conclude that the Court 
117 While the Supreme Court has demonstrated increasing discomfort with the theory of 
extra-constitutional powers over the last century, see discussion infra Part III.A.3, it has never 
directly overruled the inherent powers holding of Fong Yue Ting. To the contrary, in the first 
half of the twentieth century the Supreme Court reaffirmed the concept of inherent powers 
several times. See, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952) (referring to the "sover-
eign right to determine what noncitizens shall be permitted to remain within our borders" and 
explaining that the "lack of a clause in the Constitution specifically empowering such action 
has never been held to render Congress impotent to deal as a sovereign with resident aliens"); 
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) ("The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental 
act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in 
the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation."); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (asserting the federal authority over foreign 
relations is inherent in the United States' existence as an independent nation and exists inde-
pendently from any constitutional delegation). 
11 8 Before launching into this inquiry, it is worth pausing for a moment to address its 
relevance to the proverbial elephant in the room: the plenary powers doctrine. The birth of the 
plenary powers doctrine-the principle that restricts the judiciary from applying constitutional 
scrutiny to the substantive provisions of immigration law-can be traced, like the civil desig-
nation, to the Supreme Court' s decisions in Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), and Fong 
Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). More specifically, the plenary powers doctrine can be under-
stood as an outgrowth of the inherent powers theory. Insofar as the power to regulate immigra-
tion is derived from the inalienable nature of sovereignty and is thus extra-constitutional in 
origin, substantive constitutional limits have no place-or so the theory goes. Thus, to the 
extent that my inquiry draws into question the inherent powers theory, it also has some impli-
cations for the viability of the plenary powers doctrine. Nonetheless, even if we were to dis-
credit the inherent powers theory altogether, the plenary powers doctrine does not necessarily 
fall, as the doctrine has alternative possible justifications. See supra note 57 and accompanying 
text. 
Moreover, the viability of the plenary powers doctrine is not necessarily determinative of 
the civil or criminal nature of removal proceedings. If the plenary powers doctrine were to fall 
and constitutional scrutiny were to be applied to immigration policy, the question of whether to 
apply criminal or civil constitutional protections would remain. In the alternative, if, as I pro-
pose, we were to redesignate expulsion as a criminal proceeding, this would not necessarily 
eviscerate the plenary powers doctrine. Plenary powers could in theory survive with regard to 
exclusion decisions or could even apply to criminal expulsion proceedings since the relevant 
constitutional protections are procedural, and by definition are not covered by the substantive 
plenary powers doctrine. See Motomura, supra note 36, at 550-60 (giving historical account of 
the plenary powers doctrine). Assessing the merits of the plenary powers doctrine is the sub-
ject of an extremely rich and voluminous body of scholarship and is beyond the scope of this 
piece. See, e.g., ALEINIKOFF, supra note 21; NEUMAN, supra note 21; Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SuP. CT. REv. 255, 
256; Motomura, supra note 36, at 606; Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 
GEO. lMMJGR. L.J. 339, 339 (2002). Accordingly, I cabin my analysis to the civil or criminal 
nature of removal proceedings and leave the issue of plenary powers to the renowned scholars 
who have spoken volumes on the issue. 
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failed to confront the division of opinion among leading international law 
scholars regarding the source and nature of the immigration power and fur-
ther failed to give sufficient consideration to the unique limits that the 
American constitutional structure places upon whatever powers may be in-
herent in sovereignty. I then tum to contemporary conceptions of the nature 
of the immigration power and conclude that a consensus is emerging among 
leading scholars rejecting the inherent powers theory. Finally, returning to 
the Supreme Court's own analysis, I will examine recent Supreme Court 
decisions to assess whether the original rationale for the civil label remains 
coherent. I conclude that it does not. 
1. The Supreme Court's Original Rationale for the Inherent Powers 
Theory 
In Fong Yue Ting, the Supreme Court's primary support for the inherent 
powers theory 119 was its claim that the "leading commentators on the law of 
nations" agreed that "the right [of a state] to expel from its territory persons 
who are dangerous to the peace of the state[] [is] too clearly within the 
essential attributes of sovereignty to be seriously contested." 120 In support of 
this claim, the Court quoted from the work of Erner de Vattel, 121 Sir Robert 
Phillimore, 122 Theodore Ortolan,123 and Ludwig von Bar124 regarding the right 
of sovereign nations to expel "foreigners" 125 or "strangers."126 
While these leading commentators generally understood the power to 
exclude to be absolute, 127 no such consensus existed with regard to the power 
119 The Supreme Court also relied to a lesser degree on English history, which it claimed 
demonstrated the existence of the power to expel. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S . at 709-10. I do 
not, however, contest that both England and the United States possessed the power to expel 
noncitizens. Again, the issue is whether that power was criminal or civil in nature. None of the 
English history cited by the Supreme Court indicates that expulsion was exercised as a civil 
power. See id. at 709; see also W.F. Craies, The Right of Aliens to Enter British Territory, 6 L. 
Q. REv. 27, 34 (1890). To the contrary, a review of English history demonstrates that the 
power to expel was exercised as a criminal punishment. See Craies, supra, at 34; see also 
discussion infra Part III.B. I . 
120 149 U.S. at 707 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 130 U.S. 581 , 607 (1889)). 
121 EMER DE VATTEL, I THE LAW OF NATIONS (1853); see Fong Yue Ting , 149 U.S. at 707-
08. 
122 S1R ROBERT PtttLLIMORE, CoMMENTARJES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d. ed., But-
terworths 1879); see Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 708. 
123 ORTOLAN, D1PLOMATIE DE LA MER, (4th ed.); see Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 70. 
124 L. BAR, INTERNATIONAL LAw: PRIVATE AND CRIMINAL (G.R. Gillespie trans., Edin-
burgh, Lorimer and Gillies 1883)); see Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 708-09. 
125 I VATTEL, supra note 121, §§ 230-31; ORTOLAN, supra note 123, at 297; see Fong Yue 
Ting, 149 U.S. at 707-08. 
126 BAR, supra note 124, at 708 n.2, 711 ; PttILLIMORE, supra note 122, at 347; see Fong 
Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 708-09. 
127 See, e.g., I VATTEL, supra note 121, § 100 ("[T]he lord of the territory may forbid 
[foreigners] entrance into it, whenever he thinks proper, forbid its being entered [by 
foreigners] ."). 
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to expel. 128 Some of the leading commentators, notably Phillimore and Orto-
lan, applied an absolutist approach to the expulsion context as well. 129 
Others, including most notably Vattel, 130 recognized limits on the power of a 
nation to expel certain persons. 131 
The Supreme Court failed to confront the complex positions of these 
leading scholars in three critical ways. First, it failed to recognize that their 
references to "foreigners" or "strangers" were not likely intended to include 
permanent residents, such as the litigant in Fong Yue Ting. As Vattel ex-
plained in his chapter on "Rules with Respect to Foreigners," "foreigners" 
was understood to refer to noncitizens "who pass through or sojourn in a 
country," 132 as distinguished from "permanent residents," who are nonci-
tizens "who have received the right of perpetual residence," whom he de-
scribed as "a sort of citizen of a less privileged character." 133 Many early 
international law scholars recognized that nations possess only limited 
power to expel permanent residents. 134 Thus, the passages upon which the 
Supreme Court relied, which all refer to "strangers" or "foreigners," are of 
limited utility in assessing the nature of the power to expel permanent 
residents. m 
128 See WILLIAM Ev AN DAVIES, THE ENGLISH LAW RELATED TO ALIENS 110-12 (1931) 
(discussing international law scholars' disputes about power to expel); see also Cleveland, 
supra note 46, at 83-87 (same); see also EDWARDS. CREASY, FmsT PLATFORM OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 201, at 196 (London, Taylor and Francis 1876) (same). Compare PHILLIMORE, 
supra note 122, at ch. XXI, § 363 (espousing an absolutist view of the power to expel), and 
ORTOLAN, supra note 123 at 297 (same), with I VATTEL, supra note 121 , §§ 213,228 (ex-
plaining the limits on the power of a state to expel some noncitizens), and THEODORE D. 
WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 62, at 98-99 (3d ed. 
1872). 
129 ORTOLAN, supra note 123 at 297; PHILLIMORE, supra note 122, at ch. XXI, § 363; 
Cleveland, supra note 46, at 87; see also NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 13 (discussing Vattel on 
exclusion). 
130 I VATTEL, supra note 121, §§ 213, 228. As Professor Neuman has explained, "Erner 
de Vattel's Law of Nations, requires particular notice because of its great prestige in post-
Revolutionary America, also reflected in these debates." NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 9, 12. 
13 1 WOOLSEY, supra note 127, at § 59, at 93. See generally Cleveland, supra note 46, at 
85. 
132 I VATTEL, supra note 121, § 99. 
133 Id. at bk. I, ch. XIX, § 213; see also PHILLIMORE, supra note 122, at ch. XVII], § 321 
(characterizing domiciled noncitizens as "de facto though not dejure citizens of the country of 
their domicile"). 
134 See, e.g., I VATTEL, supra note 121, §§ 213, 228 (distinguishing the banishment of 
permanent residents from aliens who "had had no settlement" in the nation); WOOLSEY, supra 
note 127, § 62, at 98-99; see also CREASY, supra note 127, at 201; Cleveland, supra note 46, at 
86. James Madison concurred with this theory of a limited power to expel. "Even if the 
admission of friendly aliens was a matter of discretion under international law .. . once admit-
ted to the country, the grant could not be rescinded .... [T]he original bestowal may have 
been discretionary, but could not be revoked without good reason." Cleveland, supra note 46, 
at 94-95 (explaining Madison's position). 
135 A closer look at one of these passages provides a clear example of the Court's misap-
prehension of the position of the international law theorists. The Court claimed that Vattel's 
pronouncement that "[e]very nation has the right to refuse to admit a foreigner into the coun-
try, . .. [t]hus, also, it has a right to send them elsewhere," supported the absolute right. Fong 
Yue ling v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707-08 (1893) (quoting I VATTEL, supra note 120, 
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Second, even if we accept the proposition that the right to expel is in-
herent in the nature of sovereignty, the Court errs in proclaiming that appli-
cation of the civil label is therefore self-evident. For example, even 
Phillimore, who believed in the absolute right of the sovereign to expel (at 
least strangers), accepted that to force one to change his domicile is a "pun-
ishment."136 Vattel spoke in even stronger terms: "exile ... may be inflicted 
as a punishment [and] banishment is always [penal in character]."137 Thus, 
the Court's leap from its conclusion that the power to expel is an inherent 
power to its claim that expulsion is civil in nature was not the consensus 
position among scholars of the day. The Court simply failed to confront the 
possibility that the power to expel is both inherent and criminal. 
Finally, and most importantly, the Court failed to put forth any support 
for its claim that the right, even if inherent, was "inalienable."138 Put another 
way, the Court failed to confront the possibility that, even if sovereigns gen-
erally possess absolute power to exclude and expel, the Constitution limits 
that inherent authority. The Court's reliance on international law may have 
been a proper starting point but, as Professor Cleveland explains, it "simply 
had nothing to say about the extent to which domestic law might constrain 
governmental power."139 As Ortolan explained in the passage quoted in 
Fong Yue Ting, the power to expel "'may be subjected, doubtless, to certain 
forms by the domestic laws of each country.'" 140 1\vo decades earlier, the 
Supreme Court seemed keenly aware of the limits that the Constitution 
places upon ostensibly inherent powers. In Knox v. Lee, 141 the Court ad-
dressed the claim that the right to define legal tender was "inherent in every 
sovereignty": 
But upon what principle is it a necessary sovereign right? 
True, it is a right which has been exercised by absolute sovereigns. 
So has every other form of power and plunder. But that does not 
§§ 230, 231) (emphasis added). What the Court failed to consider was to whom "them" re-
ferred. Read in context, "them" clearly did not refer to permanent residents. First, Vattel 
clearly distinguished between "foreigners" and "permanent residents." Compare I VATIEL, 
supra note 121, § 99, with id. §§ 213, 228. Moreover, the sections from which the quote is 
drawn are entitled "Nature of this right," id. § 230 (emphasis added) and "Duty of nations 
towards them," id. § 231 (emphasis added). In order to understand what "this right" was and 
to whom "them" referred we must look back one section before the quoted text. Section 229 is 
entitled 'Toe exile and [the] banished man have a right to live somewhere." Id. § 229. Thus, 
"this right" referred to the right of displaced persons not to be rendered stateless and the 
corollary right of states to limit the entrance of displaced persons. ''lbem" referred to dis-
placed persons attempting to make an initial entry into a nation, not permanent residents previ-
ously granted admission to the national communjty. See also Fong Yue Ttng v. United States 
149 U.S. 698, 756 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting) (explaining that the passage of Vattel quoted by 
the court also pertained only to exclusion). 
136 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, THE LAW OF DOMICIL 25 (1847). 
137 I VA TTEL, supra note 121, § 228. 
138 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711. 
139 Cleveland, supra note 46, at 253; see also NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 121. 
140 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 708 (quoting ORTOLAN, supra note 123, at 297). 
141 79 U.S. 457 (1870). 
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make it a necessary right in a limited constitutional government 
established to maintain justice .... 
It is a mistake to suppose that the framers of this government, 
or the people who ratified their work, intended that all powers of 
government should be vested either in the Federal or the State gov-
ernments. On the contrary, this was an artificial government; not 
the result of gradual growth, but formed by the union of indepen-
dent States; not formed for the benefit of any family, or ruler, or 
person, but formed to secure certain ends for those who thus 
united. What those ends were, the framers of the government took 
care to declare. Far from requiring that the new government should 
possess all the powers usual to sovereigns, they expressly forbade 
some most sovereign powers, and refused to grant others. 142 
On its own terms, the Court's rationale for the inherent powers theory 
and the resultant civil label is unpersuasive. The Court overstated the posi-
tions of the leading international law commentators it relied upon and failed 
to appreciate the complexity of their positions individually and the diversity 
of their opinions collectively. The positions of the leading international law 
scholars at the time do not compel a conclusion one way or another regard-
ing the civil or criminal nature of the immigration powers. 
2. Contemporary Scholarly Views of the Inherent Powers Theory 
The Fong Yue Ting Court's failure to appreciate the diversity of opinion 
among the leading international law scholars of its time is particularly prob-
lematic in light of the emerging consensus among the leading modem schol-
ars disavowing the extra-constitutional inherent powers theory. 143 These 
142 See id. at 491-92. 
143 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 19-20 
(1996) (explaining that the notion that "the new United States government was to have major 
powers outside the Constitution is not intimated in the Constitution itself, in the records of the 
Convention, in the Federalist Papers, or in contemporary debates."); HAROLD HoNGJU KoH, 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER An-ER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 
94 (1990) (summarizing the "withering criticism" of the inherent powers theory); NEUMAN, 
supra note 21, at 121 ("Thus, the external sovereignty argument for unlimited power over 
immigration was flawed to begin with and carries even less persuasive force today."); PETER 
H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND lN-BETWEENS 21 (1998) (noting of the pervasive cri-
tique of the extra-constitutional theory of immigration law that "[m]any have commented 
upon its persistence and almost all have vigorously condemned it"); Cleveland, supra note 46, 
at 253 ("But the Court's doctrinal justifications for the holdings ultimately are unsatisfying as 
an explanation for the resort to inherent powers ... . International law simply had nothing to 
say about the extent to which domestic law might constrain governmental power."); see also 
ALEINIKOFF, supra note 21, at I 52; Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sover-
eignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, I 00 HARV. L. REV. 853, 862 (1987); 
Legomsky, supra note I 18; Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: 
Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 1625, 1631 
(1992); Motomura, supra note 36. 
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modern scholars have offered several different rationales for their repudia-
tion of the inherent powers theory. 
Some scholars believe that the inherent powers theory was derived 
from the Court's inability to look beyond federalism concerns. 144 The Court 
implicitly reasoned that since immigration was an outward-looking power it 
did not risk infringing upon the states and thus, it concluded, was not limited 
by the Constitution. The Court failed to fully appreciate the fact that the 
Constitution imposed limits on the federal government not just to protect the 
states but also to protect "the people." 145 
Other modern scholars believe that the inherent powers theory is 
founded on a mistaken concept of institutional competency and deference to 
political branches 146 or claim that the rationale for the theory-the need for 
absolute control over the movement of persons in the national territory-has 
eroded over time 147 or critique the inherent powers theory as driven more by 
nativist instincts than by doctrine. 148 
For our purposes, the most important critiques of the inherent powers 
theory are those driven by an analysis based upon contemporary notions of 
membership theory and the special status of permanent residents. 149 The 
Court's inherent powers analysis simply failed to account for the special sta-
tus and rights of permanent residents and the necessary limits on state power 
flowing therefrom. The rationale for the inherent powers theory-the right to 
self-preservation and the resultant power to protect against foreign invasion 
and, as the Supreme Court stated, "vast hordes of ... people crowding in 
upon us"150-is simply not relevant when considering a group of people 
(permanent residents) who have been affirmatively granted the right to live 
and work in the United States permanently.151 
These contemporary critiques of the inherent powers theory do not re-
solve the issue of whether exclusion or expulsion is properly conceived of as 
civil or criminal, but they largely reject the Supreme Court's rationale for 
applying a blanket civil label. 
144 See, e.g., NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 121; Cleveland, supra note 43, at 268. 
145 E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people."); see also Cleveland, supra note 46, at 274-75 . 
146 See, e.g., ALEINIKOFF, supra note 21, at 159-65. 
141 See NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 121, 123. 
148 See Cleveland, supra note 46, at 256. 
149 See, e.g. , ALEINIKOFF, supra note 21 , at 147-48, 167-74; Linda S. Bosniak, Member-
ship, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047, 1058 (1994). 
15
° Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 , 606 (1889). 
151 ALEINIKOFF, supra note 21, at 156; NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 131-34; Bennett, supra 
note 20, at 1095 (analogizing LPRs to denizens). 
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3. The Supreme Court's Evolving Understanding of the Nature of 
the Immigration Powers and the Inherent Powers Theory 
The inherent powers theory, though originally developed in Chae Chan 
Ping and Fong Yue Ting, has over time come to be associated most directly 
with the Supreme Court's decision, some four decades later, in United States 
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 152 In Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court 
passed upon the constitutionality of a congressional resolution that made it a 
crime to sell arms to certain foreign nations if the President proclaimed that 
such prohibition would "contribute to the reestablishment of peace." 153 The 
central issue was whether the resolution represented an unconstitutional del-
egation of legislative powers to the executive. 154 The Court held that it did 
not because the power exercised was an external power and thus, it asserted, 
not derived from the Constitution. 155 
Writing for the Court, Justice Sutherland explained that the "whole aim 
of the resolution is to affect a situation entirely external to the United States, 
and falling within the category of foreign affairs." 156 He then explained that 
only "domestic or internal affairs" were subject to the well-established con-
cept that the federal government is one of limited, delegated, constitutionally 
enumerated powers. 157 He reasoned: 
[T]he primary purpose of the Constitution was to carve from the 
general mass of legislative powers then possessed by the states 
such portions as it was thought desirable to vest in the federal gov-
ernment, leaving those not included in the enumeration still in the 
states. That this doctrine applies only to powers which the states 
had, is self-evident. And since the states severally never possessed 
international powers, such powers could not have been carved 
from the mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted to 
the United States from some other source. 158 
Sutherland went on to explain that "the investment of the federal govern-
ment with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the af-
firmative grants of the Constitution," but rather was transmitted from 
England to the federal government via extra-constitutional means. 159 In dicta, 
152 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
'
53 ld. at 312. 
154 Id. at 314. 
155 Id. at 318-20. 
156 /d. at 315. 
157 Id. at 315-16. 
158 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). But see 
Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reas-
sessment, 83 YALE L.J. I, 17 (1973) (critiquing Court's historical account in Curtiss-Wright). 
159 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316-18 (1936); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 
U.S. 580, 587-88 (1952) (characterizing the power to expel as "a weapon of defense and 
reprisal confirmed by international law as a power inherent in every sovereign state."). But cf 
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (Justice Sutherland's caveat that external powers, "like every 
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Sutherland cited Fong Yue Ting and claimed specifically that the "power to 
expel undesirable aliens" was one of the extra-constitutional external sover-
eign powers possessed by the federal govemment. 160 
Since the middle of the twentieth century, however, the Supreme Court 
has demonstrated a growing unease with the inherent powers theory. The 
Supreme Court has never explicitly overruled Fong Yue Ting or Curtiss-
Wright, 161 but over the last fifty years, it has abandoned the central claim of 
extra-constitutional powers. 162 The Court first rejected the inherent powers 
theory in Reid v. Covert. 163 Speaking for a four-Justice plurality, Justice 
Black explained that "[t]he United States is entirely a creature of the Con-
stitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in 
accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution." 164 In a con-
curring opinion Justice Harlan stated that "[t]he powers of Congress, unlike 
those of the English Parliament, are constitutionally circumscribed. Under 
the Constitution, Congress has only such powers as are expressly granted or 
those that are implied as reasonably necessary and proper to carry out the 
granted powers." 165 Together, Justice Black's plurality opinion and Justice 
Harlan's concurring opinion represent five votes rejecting the inherent pow-
ers theory and holding that all powers of the federal government are consti-
tutionally derived. 166 
A decade after Reid, the Supreme Court again made clear its rejection 
of the inherent powers theory. 167 In Afroyim v. Rusk, the Supreme Court 
overruled a prior decision in which it had held that Congress had the inher-
other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of 
the Constitution"). Justice Sutherland's claim has been challenged as historically inaccurate. 
See Lofgren, supra note 158, at 18. 
160 Cuniss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318. 
161 But cf Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1998) (questioning Justice 
Sutherland's rationale in Cuniss-Wright as "quite possibly incorrect[]"), vacated in part on 
other grounds, 165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999). 
162 See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. I, 10 (1982); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I, 5-6 (1957) 
(plurality opinion); id. at 66 (Harlan, J ., concurring). 
163 354 U.S. I (1957). 
164 Id. at 5-6 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
165 Id. at 66 (Harlan, J ., concurring). 
166 See also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S . 259, 277 (1990) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) ("I take it to be correct, as the plurality opinion in Reid v. Covert sets forth, that 
the Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in question 
are foreign or domestic.") (citation omitted). As Professor Neuman has explained: 
Since Reid v. Covert, it has generally been recognized that the Constitution as such 
"applies" wherever the government of the United States may act, and provides the 
source of the federal government's authority to act there-the disputable question is 
whether a particular constitutional limitation on the government's authority to act 
should be regarded as including within its prohibitions unusual categories of places 
or persons. 
NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 5. 
167 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253,268 (1967) (overruling Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 
(1958)). 
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ent power to expatriate citizens who vote in foreign elections. 168 In so hold-
ing, the Court explained: 
[W]e reject the idea expressed in Perez that, aside from the Four-
teenth Amendment, Congress has any general power, express or 
implied, to take away an American citizen's citizenship without his 
assent. This power cannot, as Perez indicated, be sustained as an 
implied attribute of sovereignty possessed by all nations. Other na-
tions are governed by their own constitutions, if any, and we can 
draw no support from theirs. In our country the people are sover-
eign and the Government cannot sever its relationship to the peo-
ple by taking away their citizenship. Our Constitution governs us 
and we must never forget that our Constitution limits the Govern-
ment to those powers specifically granted or those that are neces-
sary and proper to carry out the specifically granted ones. 169 
Apart from the decision overruled by Afroyim, the Supreme Court has 
never cited 17° Curtiss-Wright for either of its inherent powers claims: (1) 
"The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers 
except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied 
powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated pow-
ers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs;" 171 or (2) "the 
investment of the federal government with the powers of external sover-
eignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution."172 
While Curtiss-Wright is still frequently cited to support the proposition that 
broad deference is due to the political branches in matters of foreign af-
fairs, 173 the Supreme Court seems to have long ago abandoned the inherent 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 257. 
170 A Westlaw Keycite search of Supreme Court cases citing Curtiss-Wright for these two 
holdings results in only two cases: (1) Perez-the case overruled by Afroyim; and (2) Perpich 
v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990). Upon reading Perpich, however, it becomes 
clear that the Supreme Court was not affirmatively agreeing with either of these two holdings 
from Curtiss-Wright. Perpich involved a challenge by the Governor of Minnesota to the peace-
time deployment of state National Guard troops abroad under the Militia Clauses of the Con-
stitution. Id. at 336-38. The Court' s citation in Perpich was in footnote dicta, in support of its 
musing that, "[w]ere it not for the Militia Clauses, it might be possible to argue on like 
grounds that the constitutional allocation of powers precluded the formation of organized state 
militia." Id. at 353-54. 
171 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936). 
172 Id. at 318. 
173 See, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005) ("In our system of 
government, the Executive is 'the sole organ of the federal government in the field of interna-
tional relations' ... . " (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320)); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 
291 (1981) (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I, 17 (1965) 
("Congress-in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs-must of neces-
sity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas.") (citation 
omitted). 
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powers theory, 174 leaving its earlier conclusion based upon that theory-that 
all removal proceedings are civil-without articulated justification. 175 
This examination demonstrates that the Supreme Court misconstrued 
the international law literature upon which it relied in affixing the civil label 
to removal proceedings and incorrectly concluded that international law the-
orists were in agreement regarding the inherent and civil nature of the power 
to expel permanent residents. The Court further failed to properly consider 
the limited relevance of inherent powers in the context of a limited govern-
ment of constitutionally delegated powers. Over time, leading scholars and 
the Supreme Court itself have come to recognize the significant flaws in the 
genesis of the inherent powers theory. 
Rejecting the inherent powers theory directly undermines the Court's 
rationale for the civil label. 176 It does not, however, provide clear guidance 
114 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277 (1990) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring) ("[T]he Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions 
in question are foreign or domestic."); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. l, 5-6 (1957); 
NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 5, 123. In the immigration realm we sometimes still see references 
to the powers inherent in sovereignty, but they are almost always accompanied by references 
to the constitutional sources of immigration powers. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. I, 10 
(1982) (locating the immigration power in, inter alia, the naturalization clause and the foreign 
commerce clause as well as the "broad authority over foreign relations"). But cf Fiallo v. Bell, 
430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) ("Our cases 'have long recognized the power to expel or exclude 
aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political depart-
ments largely immune from judicial control.'") (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 
210 (1953)). 
175 Moreover, even if we were to view Curtiss-Wright's holding that external powers are 
extra-constitutional as good law, there is reason to question the designation of expulsion as an 
external power. Unlike the issue in Curtiss-Wright, expulsion of a Jong-term permanent resi-
dent can hardly be characterized as "entirely external." Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315. In 
rare, isolated cases, an individual's expulsion can have profound international implications. 
See, e.g. , Abby Goodnough & Marc Lacey, Legal Victory by Militant Cuban Exile in U.S. 
Brings Both Glee and Rage, N.Y. T!MEs, May 10, 2007, at A20 (detailing the plight of a 
Cuban national facing deportation who was wanted by both Cuban and Venezuelan govern-
ments for alleged involvement in a terrorist bombing). However, the vast majority of expulsion 
cases have more significant domestic effects. When permanent residents are deported, they are 
separated from their homes and property in the United States; their families-0ften United 
States citizens-are either abandoned in the United States or uprooted; their employers are left 
looking for replacements, and the government, both local and federal, is deprived of the tax 
revenue they generate. The collective effects of expulsion on our internal domestic affairs are 
profound and one can make a good case that expulsion is more properly characterized as an 
internal power. Cf Gerald Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment 
by the National Government, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 275, 325 ("It is in the area of admission and 
exclusion of aliens that the government's need for flexibility is greatest."). 
176 Rejecting the inherent powers theory as the source of the exclusion and expulsion 
powers necessarily raises the question: From what constitutional source then are these powers 
derived? This inquiry is beyond the scope of this article and has been the subject of much 
scholarly work. See, e.g., Christopher G. Blood, The 'True' Source of the Immigration Power 
and its Proper Consideration in the Elian Gonzalez Matter, 18 B.U. INTL L.J. 215 (2000). 
Consistent with the bifurcated approach I propose, I believe that attempting to locate a singular 
source of constitutional power to justify both exclusion and expulsion is futile. The decision to 
admit or exclude someone is closely related to the naturalization power, U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8 
cl. 4-the power to include someone in our national community-and the war power, U.S. 
CoNsT. art. I, § 8 cl. I I-the power to defend against outside invasion. But these powers do 
not fit the expulsion context as well. The confusion regarding the source of the government's 
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regarding the proper civil or criminal designation of exclusion and expulsion 
proceedings. Accordingly, I now turn to the historical record regarding the 
civil or criminal treatment of such proceedings and then to the current doc-
trinal mechanisms for distinguishing criminal from civil matters generally. 
B. Historical Analysis of the Civil or Criminal Nature 
of Removal Proceedings 
Since the utility of the historical lens is primarily the window it pro-
vides into the Framers' understanding of the nature of exclusion and expul-
sion, I focus here on the historical models most likely relied upon by the 
Framers: eighteenth century England and colonial America. 177 
1. The History of Exclusion and Expulsion in England 
Legal historians generally agree about the early nature and source of the 
power to exclude foreigners from entering England. 178 No such agreement 
exists, however, regarding the early power to expel noncitizens from within 
England. 179 
The power to grant admission or exclude foreigners from England was 
shared by the King and Parliament. The King had complete control over the 
physical entrance of noncitizens into England. 180 He could exercise this 
power to prevent foreigners from entering England whenever and however 
he saw fit. 181 In contrast to the power over physical entry, the political power 
to admit or deny admittance to the English national community was shared 
by the King and Parliament. Parliament had the power to naturalize foreign-
ers; that is, to grant them English citizenship. 182 The King, while impotent to 
naturalize foreigners, could grant foreigners denizen status, making them 
power to expel, I propose, arises because of a United States constitutional peculiarity-the 
lack of a federal police power. Historically, expulsion has been an exercise of police powers. 
See discussion infra Part m.B. The absence of that freestanding power in the federal govern-
ment and the obvious problems with locating expulsion power within the states• police powers 
has created significant confusion. There are several possible resolutions to this riddle. Ulti-
mately, though, the riddle is not unique to the expulsion context, but rather is the issue about 
which volumes have been written: what constitutional power supplies the authority to create 
and enforce federal crimes? 
177 While I do not consider myself an originalist, I do think that the Framers' original 
understanding of the Constitution is one important factor to consider. Insofar as I am claiming 
that the Framers understood broader application of constitutional protections than our system 
currently recognizes, their understanding is critical. 
178 See DAVIES, supra note 128, at 110. 
179 Id. at 112. 
180 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *259. 
181 Id. But see Craies, supra note 119, at 36-37 ("It may be [ ] true that in international 
law independent states are entitled . . . to exclude or expel alien friends . . . subject to [ ] 
treaties . . . . But this determines nothing as to the existence of any constitutional power in a 
perfectly independent state to exclude or expel strangers."). 
182 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *374. 
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English subjects. 183 "A denizen is an alien born, but who has obtained ... by 
gift of the king letters patent to make him an English subject ... A denizen 
is in a kind of middle state, between an alien and a natural born subject, and 
partakes of both of them." 184 Denizen status, which was widely used in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 185 has been recognized as a precursor to the 
modem lawful permanent resident status. 186 The power to grant or deny 
physical admission and the power to grant or deny political admission to the 
national community, whether exercised by the King or Parliament, were 
conceived of as the power to bestow a benefit and were, therefore, civil 
administrative powers unrelated to criminal punishment. 
There is no such scholarly consensus regarding the nature and source of 
the power to expel noncitizens from within England. Some commentators 
maintain that, as with exclusion, the King had unfettered power to expel 
noncitizens whenever and however he saw fit. 187 Other legal historians view 
the power to expel as a punishment that could only be meted out for viola-
tions of the criminal laws of Parliament with all the procedural protections 
attaching thereto. 188 Thus, the disagreement as to the civil or criminal nature 
of the expulsion power has often taken the form of a debate about whether 
the power to expel lay with the King or with Parliament. 189 In light of the 
disagreements regarding the theoretical nature of the expulsion power in 
common-law England, we are forced to focus our inquiry instead on how 
this power was actually exercised. Investigating the mechanisms through 
which expulsion was realized in early England will help us understand how 
the American constitutional Framers likely conceived of this power. 190 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 373. 
185 See 7 THE WoRKS OF FRANCIS BACON 648-49 (James Spedding et al . eds., Garrett 
Press 1968) (1868). 
186 See Fong Yue Tmg v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 736-38 (1893) (Brewer, J., 
dissenting). 
187 See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *259-60 ("[Foreigners] are under the king's 
protection; though liable to be sent home whenever the king sees occasion."). Though Black-
stone's words have been interpreted to mean he saw the Crown as empowered to expel nonci-
tizens, I do not believe Blackstone intended these words to apply to denizens, or their modern 
corollary-permanent residents-since he conceived of denizens as being "in a kind of middle 
state, between an alien and a natural-born subject, and partakes of both of them." Id. at 373. 
188 See, e.g. , Alien Law of England, 42 EDINBURGH REv. 99, 99 (1825) (arguing that "ex-
pulsion" is a "punishment on conviction in a court of justice, for certain offenses, where as a 
natural born subject might be left to work out his penalty at home" and that the "punishment" 
must be subject to the "several odious necessities of criminal Jaw"); Craies, supra note 119, at 
34-35 ("England was a complete asylum to foreigners who did not offend against English 
Jaw."). Notably, the text of the Magna Carta itself provides some support for this view insofar 
as it guarantees that "No Freeman shall be .. . exiled .. . but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, 
or by Law of the Land." Magna Carta, Article 39 (1215). 
189 See, e.g., Alien Law of England, supra note 188, at 99; Craies, supra note 119, at 35; 
see also Fong Yue Ting , 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1892) (recognizing the debate over whether the 
Crown or Parliament had the power to expel). 
'
90 In Fong Yue Ting, the Supreme Court relied, in part, on English assertions of the power 
to expel. 149 U.S. at 709-10. The English history cited by the Court is not relevant to our 
analysis here because (I) all of the history cited post-dated the drafting of the Constitution and, 
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There is very little historical evidence of England preventing nonci-
tizens from entering its realm or expelling them from within prior to the 
seventeenth century. 191 That is not to say that prior to the seventeenth century 
no one was expelled from England. To the contrary, banishment had been 
recognized and used as a criminal punishment imposed on foreigners and 
subjects alike since ancient times. 192 Abjuration of the realm, a type of ban-
ishment whereby a criminal defendant could escape prosecution by seeking 
the assistance of clergy, confessing, and promising to voluntarily leave the 
realm and not return upon pain of death, became a common form of criminal 
punishment in England as early as the thirteenth century. 193 
The seventeenth century saw a significant increase in levels of immi-
gration to England and with it, rising xenophobia and concerns about eco-
nomic competition. 194 In response, a commission was formed to consider 
how to compel noncitizens within England to bind themselves to the laws of 
England or leave. 195 The commission's mission was apparently driven by a 
concern that, without such voluntary submission, England would have no 
legal authority to enforce its laws against noncitizens. 196 Since the require-
ment that noncitizens bind themselves to English law appears unrelated to 
criminal law, it may be viewed as an early assertion of a civil power to 
deport noncitizens. However, two factors significantly undermine the likely 
influence that this historical episode had on the Framers' conception of the 
power to expel. First, the commission's work did not, in reality, lead to the 
expulsion of any noncitizens from England. 197 Second, insofar as the com-
mission asserted a civil power to expel noncitizens, that power did not ex-
tend to noncitizens who had been invited into the national community since 
denizens were all bound to obey the laws of England.198 Meanwhile, 
therefore, does not reflect the intent of the Framers; and (2) the history was cited merely in 
support of the Court's assertion that the federal government possessed the power to expel and 
not in regard to its conclusion that the nature of the power was civil. 
191 Craies, supra note 119, at 33-34 (explaining that the examples from sixteenth century 
England of the exclusion or expulsion of aliens are virtually non-existent). The expulsion of 
Jews from England in 1290 is not properly understood as an early example of the expulsion of 
noncitizens because most of the people expelled were native born and their expulsion was 
justified not by their immigration status but rather because they were considered serfs rather 
than freemen. Id. at 30. The rights of Jews in England did "not depend on common law, but 
upon the will of their lord the king," as Jews were considered chattels of the king. Id. at 31. 
192 William Garth Snider, Banishment: The History of Its Use and a Proposal for Its Abo-
lition Under the First Amendment, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455, 459-
61 ( 1998) ( citing examples of banishment as a criminal punishment in various societies dating 
back to 2285 B.C.). 
193 W.F. Craies, The Compulsion of Subjects to Leave the Realm, 6 L. Q. REv. 390, 393-96 
(1890); see also Snider, supra note 192, at 461 (explaining the widespread use of abjuration in 
England between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries). 




198 As subjects, denizens were already bound to obey the laws of England. BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 20, at *374. Insofar as the commission' s work is an example of the civil power to 
expel noncitizens who have not been admitted to the national community, this comports with 
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throughout the early portion of the seventeenth century, abjuration of the 
realm continued to be used as a criminal punishment for noncitizens and 
subjects alike. This punishment was, however, perceived to be losing its de-
terrent effect, and in 1623 the criminal punishment of abjuration of the realm 
was abolished. 199 
The eighteenth century saw the rise to prominence of transportation-
another form of banishment-which was likely the dominant historical ex-
pulsion model for the Framers. 200 Transportation was a form of criminal pun-
ishment whereby convicts would be sentenced to indentured servitude in or 
banished to the colonies. 201 Transportation, originally administered on a hap-
hazard basis, depended upon entrepreneurial ship captains to transport and 
sell those sentenced to transportation as indentured servants in America.202 
Like its precursor, abjuration of the realm, transportation was imposed upon 
citizens and noncitizens alike.203 In 1718, sparked by rising crime rates and 
the haphazard and uneven enforcement of transportation orders, the English 
Parliament passed the Transportation Act.204 This act provided, for the first 
time, public funding to send people sentenced to transportation to the Ameri-
can colonies.205 
As a result of the Transportation Act, transportation became the most 
common form of punishment in felony cases in England during the eight-
eenth century.206 It was the only significant form of punishment short of 
death utilized during this period207 and was the only method by which En-
gland expelled either subjects or citizens. 208 Between the passage of the 
Transportation Act in 1718 and the end of transportation to the Americas in 
1775, one quarter of all British immigrants to America, approximately 
50,000 people, were sent as a result of being sentenced to transportation as 
punishment for a crime. 209 The prevalence of this phenomenon was not lost 
my assertion that expulsion from the national community is criminal whereas physical removal 
of noncitizens who have not been admitted to the national community is properly understood 
to be a civil decision not to admit a noncitizen to the national community. Other commentators 
have also expressed the opinion that the Crown may possess a power to expel only those 
noncitizens who have not been invited into the national community as denizens. Alien Law of 
England, supra note 188, at 132 (quoting an opinion of Sir Ed Nothey that the Queen may 
compel "aliens, not made denizens, or naturalized ... to depart"). 
199 Bleichmar, supra note 37, at 121. 
200 For an excellent review of the historical phenomenon of criminal transportation, see 
Bleichmar, supra note 37, at 120-30. 
20 1 Craies, supra note 193, at 396. 
202 Bleichmar, supra note 37, at 123-24. 
203 In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged that 
transportation was a punishment imposed on both citizens and noncitizens. See 149 U.S. 698, 
709 (1893); see also Kanstroom, supra note 37, at 1901. 
204 Transportation Act of 1718, 4 Geo. I, c. 11 ; see also Bleichrnar, supra note 36, at 124. 
205 Bleichmar, supra note 37, at 125-26. 
206 Some scholars estimate that as many as seventy percent of felons were sentenced to 
transportation during the height of its use in the eighteenth century. Id. at 126. 
207 Id. at 121. 
208 Id. at 129. 
209 Id. at 127. 
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on the colonists, who grew increasingly displeased with the practice.210 In 
1775, with the outbreak of the American Revolution, transportation to 
America came to an abrupt halt. 211 
In contrast to the accepted civil power to admit or exclude noncitizens 
and the prevalent and extremely visible model of expulsion as a criminal 
punishment for citizens and noncitizens alike, there was no practice of civil 
expulsion of noncitizens in England that would have shaped the Framers' 
understanding of expulsion.212 Thus, the English model, and its likely influ-
ence on the Framers, lends some support to the notion that they viewed the 
power to expel, in contrast to the power to exclude, as a criminal 
punishment. 
2. The History of Exclusion and Expulsion in Colonial America 
The history of expulsion and exclusion laws and practices in colonial 
America echoes the English model. Initially, the colonies were primarily 
interested in encouraging immigration and, as a result, neither the exclusion 
nor the expulsion of noncitizens was a significant feature of the colonies' 
immigration laws. 213 In fact, there was considerable competition among the 
colonies for new immigrants.214 Several factors drove this competition, in-
cluding the need for labor, the fear of being outnumbered in armed conflicts 
with Indian nations, the abundance of unconquered land, and the drive of 
colonial powers to establish stable and significant colonies. 215 
It was not long, however, before the open arms of the colonies began to 
close to some immigrants. As Emberson Edward Proper detailed in his au-
thoritative study of colonial immigration laws, in the second century of En-
glish colonization the various colonies began to enact numerous and varied 
exclusion laws.216 While exclusion laws were pervasive throughout the colo-
nies, the details of who was excluded varied greatly from colony to colony. 
Some exclusion laws erected bars to admission based on religion, indigence, 
210 Id. at 128-29. A "vigorous protest went up from the colonists" in response to the 
transportation system. EMBERSON EDWARD PROPER, COLONIAL IMM10RAT10N LAws: A STUDY 
OF THE ReoULATION OP lMMIORATION BY THE ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA 20 (W.S. Hein 
2003) (1900). Benjamin Franklin famously suggested that the colonists send King George III 
rattlesnakes in return for the transported criminals. Id. Toe colonists attempted to enact laws 
barring transportation but all were overridden by the English authorities. Id.; see also 
MALDWYN Ail.EN JONES, AMERICAN lMMIORATION 43, 61, 65 (1960). 
211 Bleichmar, supra note 37, at 128. 
212 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 756 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting) 
(noting that "deportation from the realm has not been exercised in England since Magna 
Charta, except in punishment for crime, or as a measure in view of existing or anticipated 
hostilities"); Craies, supra note 119, at 34-35; see also PROPER, supra note 210, at 19 (refer-
ring to transportation as a "system of deportation of criminals"). 
213 EDWARD P. HtrrCHJNSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 
389 (1981); PROPER, supra note 210, at 13-16. 
214 HtrrCHINSON, supra note 212, at 389; PROPER, supra note 210, at 13-16. 
215 PRoPER, supra note 210, at 17. 
216 Id. at 17-72. 
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national origin, criminal status, or race.217 These exclusion laws were undeni-
ably administrative and civil in nature and did not implicate the criminal 
process in any way. 
The efforts of the American colonies to exclude various classes of im-
migrants had only limited effect on the overall flow of immigrants into the 
colonies. Two reasons underlie their limited influence. First, the diversity in 
the laws meant that an immigrant unwelcome in one colony was likely to be 
welcomed into another. Thus, while these laws played a role in developing 
the distinct characters of the colonies, they largely served to divert immi-
grants from one colony to another.218 Second, England ultimately held a veto 
power over the colonies' efforts to exclude certain immigrants and exercised 
that power to strike admission barriers that did not suit its interests.219 The 
most notable example of England's use of this power was its rebuff to colo-
nial efforts to cease the practice of transporting convicted criminals to the 
American colonies. 220 
In sharp contrast to the well-established civil administrative power to 
exclude undesirable immigrants, American colonial history is devoid of any 
civil laws used to expel noncitizens after admission.221 The only mechanism 
to expel persons from the colonies was banishment-a criminal punishment 
imposed after completion of the criminal process with all the relevant proce-
dures and protections attached thereto.222 Thus, insofar as the Framers' con-
ception of deportation or expulsion was likely shaped by the historical 
models of the American colonies and common-law England, both models 
drew a pronounced line between the civil administrative power to exclude 
noncitizens and the criminal power to expel those already present. 
While obviously not reference points for the Framers, . the early immi-
gration laws following the framing of the Constitution are nevertheless use-
ful in understanding the Framers' concept of deportation because these early 
laws are likely reflections of the common notions of the day. For the first 
hundred years of the United States, regulation of immigration was largely 
left to the states. 223 In the early state immigration regulations, we again see 
217 Id.; HUTCHINSON, supra note 213, at 388-96; JoNEs, supra note 210, at 43; NEUMAN, 
supra note 21, at 21-22. 
218 PROPER, supra note 210, at 89. 
219 Id. at 16. 
220 Id. at 20, 61; see also supra notes 198, 208 and accompanying text. 
221 See JoNES, supra note 210, at 43; NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 22; PROPER, supra note 
210, at 25, 26; Kanstroom, supra note 37, at 1908 ("Colonial and state laws, which often 
focused on the exclusion of convicted criminals, seem never to have focused on the deporta-
tion of noncitizens for post-entry criminal conduct."). 
222 See NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 22-23 (''To the best of my knowledge, no state statutes 
singled out aliens for expulsion from the state or the United States as punishment for serious 
crime, but aliens were subject to these generally applicable sanctions."); PROPER, supra note 
210, at 25-26, 33, 37. 
223 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law ( 1776-1875 ), 
93 CoLUM. L. REv. 1833 (1993) (reviewing the state immigration laws during this period); see 
also HUTCHINSON, supra note 213, at 396-404. 
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the same divide: the states had civil exclusion laws based on grounds that 
were similar to the colonial laws, but expulsion could be achieved only as 
punishment for a serious crime. 224 
One notable exception to the early state domination of immigration reg-
ulation is the Alien Act of 1798, which purported to grant the President 
discretion to summarily expel even friendly "aliens."m This aspect of the 
Act expired in 1800 and was never enforced and thus was never subject to 
judicial scrutiny. The Act is now widely believed to have been unconstitu-
tional. 226 The debate surrounding the passage of the Alien Act is, neverthe-
less, of some utility because, unlike the records of the Constitutional 
Convention, this debate contained clear statements by several of the Framers 
regarding their conception of the power to expel. Madison and Jefferson 
were clear in their opposition to the Act, arguing forcefully in resolutions 
adopted by Virginia and Kentucky that the Constitution granted the govern-
ment no power to effect the civil administrative removal of "alien friends" 
and that such "aliens" could only be expelled pursuant to a criminal pro-
ceeding with all the constitutional protections attaching thereto.227 This was 
224 See Neuman, supra note 223, at 1841, 1844. 
225 For an excellent and detailed history of the Alien Act, see Cleveland, supra note 3, at 
87-98. 
226 In 1832, then-Vice President John C. Calhoun "asserted that the unconstitutionality of 
the Alien and Sedition laws was 'settled."' Cleveland, supra note 46, at 98 (quoting Letter of 
Aug. 28, 1832 from Vice President Calhoun to Governor Hamilton). But cf id. at 98 n.664 
(noting some disagreement with Calhoun). Some opponents of the Act specifically argued that, 
at the time of its passage, the expulsion of alien friends must proceed through the same crimi-
nal process applicable to citizens. See 8 Annals of Cong. 2005, 2012 (1798) Edward Living-
ston stated: 
It is an acknowledged principle . .. that alien friends, ... residing among us, are 
entitled to the protection of our laws, and that during their residence, they owe a 
temporary allegiance to our Government. If they are accused of violating this alle-
giance, the same laws which interpose in the case of a citizen must determine the 
truth of the accusation, and if found guilty they are liable to the same punishment. 
Id.; see also Cleveland, supra note 46, at 97 n.662. 
227 James Madison argued: 
Alien friends, except in the single case of public ministers, are under the municipal 
law, and must be tried and punished according to that law only .... This argument 
also, by referring the alien-act to the power of Congress to define and punish of-
fences against the law of nations, yields the point that the act is of a penal, not 
merely of a preventive operation .... And if it be a penal act, the punishment it 
inflicts, must be justified by some offence that deserves it. ... [A]nd the punish-
ment must be conducted according to the municipal law, not according to the law of 
nations. 
James Madison, Report of 1799 to the Virginia House of Delegates, http://www.constitution. 
org/rf/vr_l 799.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2008). Thomas Jefferson argued: 
'An Act concerning aliens' is contrary to the Constitution, one amendment to which 
has provided that 'no person shalt be deprived of liberty without due progress of 
law' ; and that another having provided that 'in all criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall enjoy the right to public trial by an impartial jury, to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance 
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by no means, however, a consensus position among the Framers. Toe Alien 
Act was, after all, sponsored by the Adams administration, which believed 
that citizens "could not be disenfranchised other than following conviction 
by a jury trial" but that aliens "could be removed 'merely ... from motives' 
of policy or security. Their removal was not a punishment, but the with-
drawal 'of an indulgence."' 228 Since we have no conclusive direct evidence 
of the Framers' conception of the nature of expulsion proceedings, the histor-
ical evidence we have compiled regarding the colonial and common-law En-
glish treatment of such proceedings is the best evidence available of the 
Framers' intent. 
Toe historical evidence gives us an important window into how the 
Framers conceived of the power to expel and, more specifically, whether 
they conceived of it as a criminal punishment. In the jurisdictions most 
likely to influence the Framers, common-law England and colonial America, 
the evidence is quite consistent. Toe only historical precedents for expelling 
persons from within the nation were transportation, banishment, abjuration 
of the realm, and conditional pardons229-all of which were imposed only as 
criminal punishments. The modem notion of civil deportation was a foreign 
concept to the Framers. In contrast, England, the colonies, and the early 
states all had civil administrative laws concerning the exclusion of certain 
immigrants. 
C. Applying the Supreme Court 's Contemporary Civil-Criminal Divide 
Test to Determine the Nature of Exclusion 
and Expulsion Proceedings 
In earlier days, criminal law was understood to involve public offenses 
against society, and civil law was understood to govern private disputes be-
of counsel for his defense;' the same act, undertaking to authorize the President to 
remove a person out of the United States, who is under the protection of the law, on 
his own suspicion, without accusation, without jury, without public trial, without 
confrontation of the witnesses against him, without heating [sic] witnesses in his 
favor, without defense, without counsel, is contrary to the provision also of the Con-
stitution, is therefore not law. but utterly void, and of no force. 
Thomas Jefferson, The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, http://www.constitution.org/cons/kent 
1798.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2008). 
228 Cleveland, supra note 46, at 93 (quoting Report of the select committee of the House 
of Representatives, made to the House of Representatives on Feb. 21 , 1799, 9 Annals of Cong. 
2986, 2987 (1799)) (citations omitted). 
229 Conditional pardons were granted to people facing criminal prosecution who agreed to 
be expelled from the nation. See Bleichmar, supra note 37, at 125. Abjuration of the realm was 
the precursor of banishment in medieval England. See WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, 3 A HlsTORY 
OF ENGLISH LAW 303 (1923). After committing a crime, the person could flee for refuge or 
sanctuary to the church; if she confessed to the crime and pledged to leave the kingdom and 
not return without the permission of the Crown, she would receive safe passage to a port from 
which they could depart from the kingdom. See Bleichmar, supra note 37, at 120-21 ; Wayne 
A. Logan, Criminal law Sanctuaries, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 32 1, 327-28 (2003). 
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tween individuals.230 But this simplistic formulation of the boundary between 
civil and criminal law has become antiquated in the age of the administrative 
state. Now, innumerable civil administrative matters can more fairly be char-
acterized as offenses against society than as private disputes.231 The rise of 
the administrative state thus necessitated a new model for explaining the 
boundary between civil and criminal proceedings. 
The Supreme Court responded to this necessity in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez232 and United States v. Ward. 233 Together, these two cases define 
the modern boundary between civil and criminal proceedings.234 The test re-
quires us first to examine "whether Congress, in establishing the penalizing 
mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one la-
bel. "235 If Congress intended to create a criminal penalty, that is the end of 
the inquiry, and the Court will give effect to Congress's intention. If, how-
ever, Congress intended to create a civil sanction, then we must examine 
whether there is the "clearest proof' that "the statutory scheme was so puni-
tive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention."236 The Court has 
developed a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors to consider when evaluat-
ing the second prong of the test: 
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
ment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, 
[4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment-retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to 
which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, 
and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative 
purpose assigned. . . . 237 
230 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *1489. 
231 Proceedings to enforce civil environmental regulations and tax regulations are but two 
examples. 
232 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
233 448 U.S. 242 (1980). 
234 For a brief period between 1989 and 1997, the Supreme Court employed an alternative 
test to determine the civil or criminal nature of proceedings in certain circumstances. See 
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1993) (applying alternative test in analyzing 
claim under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment); United States v. Halper, 
490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989) (applying alternative test in analyzing double jeopardy claim). Under 
the alternative test, the inquiry centered on whether the sanction was punitive, not whether it 
was criminal. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448. Thus, the relevant constitutional protections would 
apply to any sanction that could not "fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but 
rather [could] only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes." Id. 
This alternative test was abandoned in 1997 when the Supreme Court explicitly overruled 
Halper. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 101-02 (1997). 
235 Ward, 448 U.S. at 248. 
236 Id. at 248-49. 
237 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S . at 168-69 (footnotes omitted). 
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In making this assessment, we must look categorically at the type of pro-
ceeding. 238 In a given exclusion case, the factors may point to a criminal 
designation and, in a given expulsion case, the factors may point to a civil 
designation. But a case-by-case assessment of the civil or criminal nature of 
a proceeding "would prove unworkable. Such an analysis would never con-
clusively resolve whether a particular scheme is punitive."239 Thus, we must 
analyze the characteristics of a proceeding in general, recognizing that in 
some individual cases the application of the general label may seem 
counterintuitive. 
While the Court's approach has been the subject of significant criti-
cism,240 evaluating the merits of the Court's approach is beyond the scope of 
this project. Starting from the premise that coherence and consistency are 
accepted virtues in a common-law system, application of the Court's modem 
approach to defining the civil-criminal divide is an important lens through 
which to evaluate the civil or criminal nature of removal proceedings regard-
less of any critiques that that approach may warrant. Because this modem 
approach was developed decades after the Supreme Court originally held 
that all removal proceedings are civil, and because the Court has never un-
dertaken a substantive reevaluation of that holding, the modem definition of 
the boundary between civil and criminal proceedings has never been applied 
by any court in the immigration context. The application of the modem test 
provides compelling support for the bifurcated approach: exclusion is civil 
and expulsion is criminal.241 
1. Congress Intended to Create a Civil Scheme for Removal 
Proceedings 
Congress clearly intended to create a civil scheme for all removal pro-
ceedings. 242 While Congress has not expressly applied the civil label to re-
238 Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 262 (2001). 
239 Id. at 263. 
240 See, e.g., Gregory Y. Porter, Uncivil Punishment: The Supreme Court's Ongoing Strug-
gle with Constitutional Limits on Punitive Civil Sanctions, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 517, 523 ( 1997); 
Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Pro-
cedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 781-82 (1997); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 113 
(2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("No matter how often the Court may repeat and manipulate 
multifactor tests that have been applied in wholly dissimilar cases involving only one or two of 
these three aspects of these statutory sanctions, it will never persuade me .. .. "). 
24 1 While courts have yet to apply the modem test to the immigration context, scholars 
have engaged in such analysis. See, e.g., Bleichmar, supra note 37, at 148-60; Pinzon, supra 
note 37. Thus, the value of applying the current civil-criminal divide jurisprudence to the 
immigration context has been recognized by others and is not novel. The analysis in this sec-
tion owes a debt to these scholars. The bifurcated approach to this analysis is what I seek to 
contribute to the existing literature. 
242 While the congressional record contains significant evidence that Congress was moti-
vated, at least in part, by a punitive purpose such as retribution, see infra note 285 and accom-
panying text, that inquiry is irrelevant to the first step of the analysis. The first question in the 
Mendoza-Martinez/Ward test is whether Congress intended to create a criminal scheme with 
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moval proceedings, its implicit application of that label is beyond dispute. 
The procedures Congress created for removal proceedings are consistent 
with the civil label and would be impermissible in the criminal context.243 
Moreover, when Congress intended to create a criminal immigration offense, 
it explicitly labeled such offense as "criminal" or as "punishment."244 The 
absence of such designation for the grounds of removability245 indicates, by 
contrast, Congress's intention to attach a civil label to those sections.246 Since 
congressional intent to apply the civil label is clear, expulsion and/or exclu-
sion proceedings can only be characterized as criminal if we find the "clear-
est proof' that "the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or 
effect as to negate that intention. "247 
2. Assessing the Mendoza-Martinez Factors 
I undertake this analysis by looking at the various factors individually, 
though I recognize the inherent deficiencies in this approach-namely that a 
factor-by-factor analysis is of only limited utility in a complex scheme such 
as the Mendoza-Martinez test, where the relative weight of each factor may 
vary from case to case. I attempt to compensate for this deficiency by paying 
particular attention to the relative weight assigned to the various factors. 
a. Whether the Sanction Involves an Affirmative or Negative 
Disability or Restraint 
The application of this factor is fairly straightforward. The expulsion of 
a person previously admitted to this country as a permanent resident is a 
paradigmatic affirmative disability. The person is not only affirmatively re-
moved from the political community of the United States but is likewise 
all the rights attaching thereto. The plain language of the INA makes clear that Congress did 
not intend to create a criminal scheme. 
243 See, e.g., INA§ 240(b)(4)(A}, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (Supp. 1998) (prohibiting the 
appointment of counsel at government expense); INA § 240(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2) 
(Supp. 1998) (placing the burden of proof on the noncitizen to prove admissibility); INA 
§ 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § I 229a(c)(3)(A) (Supp. 1998) (establishing the burden of proof on a 
charge of deportability to be "by clear and convincing evidence," not beyond a reasonable 
doubt) . See generally United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288-89 (1996) (same); United 
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363-64 (1984) (relying on the proce-
dural mechanisms Congress established as evidence of intent to apply the civil label). 
244 See, e.g., INA§ 274, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2000) (criminal penalties for transporting and 
harboring unauthorized entrants); INA§ 274A(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f) (2000) (criminal penal-
ties for engaging in a pattern or practice of hiring unauthorized workers); INA § 274C(e), 8 
U.S.C. § 1324c(e) (2000) (criminal penalties for failure to disclose role in preparing fraudulent 
applications). 
245 See generally INA§ 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182; INA§ 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000). 
246 While every word included in a statute is presumed to have been included for a pur-
pose, "it is also the case that every word excluded from a statute must be presumed to have 
been excluded for a purpose." NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 46:6 (6th ed. 2000); see, e.g. , Monell v. Dep' t of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978). 
247 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980). 
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physically removed from the territory of the nation. In contrast, the exclu-
sion of a person seeking admission to the United States is an equally para-
digmatic negative restraint. If the person is excluded, the status quo is 
maintained-the person is not part of the national political community. 
Two realities slightly complicate the analysis of this factor with respect 
to exclusion. First, many people subject to exclusion, as I have defined it, 
are physically removed from the United States (though the majority are sim-
ply denied admission from abroad).248 For example, a person who comes to 
this country as a visitor, marries a citizen, applies for adjustment of status to 
become a permanent resident, but is adjudged to be inadmissible, will be 
physically removed from the territory. Thus, while the status quo may be 
maintained for such people in the political sense-they were never granted 
admission to the political community-the experience of exclusion may feel 
very much like an affirmative disability.249 
Second, a person subject to either exclusion or expulsion proceedings 
may be detained during the pendency of the removal proceedings.250 Physical 
detention is an affirmative restraint251-people once free to move about are 
taken into physical custody. While the ultimate goal of the proceedings is 
not detention, it may be useful to conceive of the detention incident to such 
proceedings as part of the sanction envisioned by the statutory scheme. 252 
Thus, while this first factor unambiguously cuts in favor of characteriz-
ing expulsion proceedings as criminal, the influence of this factor on the 
analysis of exclusion is less clear. In regard to exclusion, we must, however, 
consider that the majority of people excluded are simply denied visas from 
abroad and thus are neither physically removed nor detained and, therefore, 
are only subject to a negative restraint. Moreover, if we envision exclusion 
and expulsion as principally political acts-deciding whom to admit into the 
political community and whom to expel from that community-then exclu-
sion is best understood as a negative disability and this factor alone may 
make it impossible to establish the "clearest proof' that exclusion is so pu-
248 
"Approximately 700,000 aliens apply for visas abroad each year." Guido S. Weber, 
Unresolved Issues on Controlling the Tuberculosis Epidemic Among the Foreign-Born in the 
United States, 22 AM. J.L. & MEo. 503,515 n.114 (1996) (citing National Action Plan to 
Combat Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. No. RR-
! I, at 18 (1992)). That is double the amount of people placed in removal proceedings in 2006, 
which includes people subject to both exclusion and expulsion. See U.S. DEPT OF JusncE, 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, 2006 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 82 (2006); see 
also supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
249 C.f State v. C.M., 746 So. 2d 410, 415-20 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (recognizing dis-
placement from one's home as an affirmative disability) . 
250 INA§ 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2000). 
251 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100 (2003) (commenting that "the punishment of 
imprisonment ... is the paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint"); Kansas v. Hendricks, 
521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997) (recognizing that civil commitment of persons with mental disorders 
was an affirmative restraint but holding that such commitment was civil because this factor 
was outweighed by others). 
252 See infra note 285 and accompanying text. 
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nitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the intention of Congress to 
label it as civil. 253 
b. Whether the Sanction Has Historically Been Regarded as a 
Punishment 
The Supreme Court has recognized the particular importance of histori-
cal evidence to the analysis of the civil or criminal nature of a proceeding 
and has frequently relied on this factor in making its determination.254 We 
need not revisit the historical evidence reviewed in Part IV.B. Strong histori-
cal evidence supports the conclusion that expulsion is the modem-day 
equivalent of the criminal sanctions of banishment, transportation, and abju-
ration of the realm.255 The history of colonial America, common-law En-
gland, and the first hundred years of the United States are all devoid of any 
civil mechanism utilized to expel persons previously granted admission to 
the political community.256 Moreover, purportedly civil sanctions that resem-
ble the historical punishment of banishment much less closely than expul-
sion have been found, under the Mendoza-Martinez/Ward test, to be so 
punitive in nature as to negate the legislature's intention to create a civil 
sanction, in large part because of their historical similarity.257 In sharp con-
trast, the power to exclude unwanted foreigners has always been exercised 
as a civil administrative power.258 Accordingly, this factor cuts sharply in 
favor of characterizing expulsion as criminal and exclusion as civil. 
c. Whether the Sanction Requires a Finding of Scienter and 
Whether the Regulated Behavior ls Already Criminal 
We consider these two factors together here because, in many instances, 
the finding of scienter that triggers removal is the scienter of the underlying 
crime that forms the basis of a removal charge. 
253 See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997) (relying in part on the fact 
that disbarment is not an affirmative disability to hold that such sanction is civil); Flemming v. 
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,617 (1960) (holding that a statute disentitling persons who are deported 
from receiving social security benefits is not punitive because it is not an "affirmative disabil-
ity or restraint"). 
254 See Smith, 538 U.S. at 97-99; Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104; United States v. Ursery, 518 
U.S. 267, 291 (1996); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993). 
255 See discussion supra Part III.B. I. 
256 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
251 See, e.g., Does v. City of Indianapolis, No. 06-865, 2006 WL 2927598, *8-9 (S.D. Ind. 
Oct. 5, 2006) (holding that an ordinance restricting child sex offenders from traveling within 
I 000 feet of public playgrounds, recreation centers, swimming and wading pools, sports fields, 
and facilities violates the Ex Post Facto Clause); Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 
735, 747-49 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (holding that an ordinance banning convicted drug users from 
traveling through "drug exclusion zones" violates Double Jeopardy Clause), ajf'd on other 
grounds, 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002) (not reaching the criminal vs. civil issue); cf Smith, 
538 U.S. 84, 98 (recognizing expulsion from community as traditional punishment). 
258 See discussion supra Part III.B.l, 2, notes 182-187, 217-221 and accompanying text. 
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The Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") contains numerous 
criminal grounds of removability applicable to permanent residents,259 which 
collectively cover the vast majority of crimes in most penal codes, including 
virtually all theft crimes, violent crimes, sex crimes, gun crimes, fraud 
crimes, and drug crimes. In a vast majority of expulsion cases-cases where 
the government seeks to deport a permanent resident-the act which triggers 
the removal charge is a criminal conviction.260 Thus, in the vast majority of 
expulsion cases the behavior being sanctioned is necessarily already criminal 
since the conviction of a crime is the basis of the removal charge. In such 
cases, the finding of scienter in the underlying criminal conviction is obvi-
ously then required for expulsion. As discussed below, those rare instances 
where a strict liability offense triggers expulsion, with no scienter require-
ment, do not significantly alter this analysis. 
Even in those rare instances where the government seeks to expel a 
permanent resident for something other than a criminal conviction, the sanc-
tioned conduct is almost always otherwise punishable under criminal law. 
For example, deportability charges that do not require a formal conviction, 
such as alien smuggling,261 marriage fraud, 262 document fraud, 263 terrorism or 
espionage,264 drug abuse,265 falsely claiming citizenship,266 failure to report a 
change of address,267 violation of a protection order,268 and unlawful vot-
259 INA § 237(a) sets forth the classes of "deportability" which are applicable to any 
noncitizen "in and admitted to the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2000). This includes all 
permanent residents in the United States and various other noncitizens admitted in nonimmi-
grant statuses, including visitors, students, etc. Noncitizens attempting to enter the United 
States or who entered the country illegally are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility set 
forth in INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2000). 
260 A 2006 Congressional Research Service report detailed the percentage breakdown of 
the various reasons for removals. Immigration Enforcement Within the United States, CRS 
Report (Apr. 6, 2006), available at http://www.fas .org/sgp/crs/misc/RL3335 I .pdf. Excluding 
the reasons that would be inapplicable to the expulsion of a permanent resident ("Not In 
Status", "Attempted Entry", and "Previously Removed"), 92.5% of removals were based on 
criminal charges in fiscal year 2004-the most recent year reported. Id. at CRS-17. That per-
centage is likely to be skewed toward minimizing the number of expulsions based on criminal 
charges since the remaining 7.5% includes both permanent residents and non-permanent re-
sidents who are significantly more likely to be charged with the miscellaneous less common 
grounds of removal, such as document fraud, see INA § 237(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3) 
(2006). 
26 1 See INA § 237(a)(l)(E), 8 U.S.C. § I 227(a)(l )(E) (2000) (deportability ground); 8 
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)(A) (2000) (criminal charge). 
262 See INA § 237(a)(l)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(G) (deportability ground); 8 U.S.C. 
§ I 325(c) (2000) (criminal charge). 
263 See INA § 237(a)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § I 227(a)(3)(C) (deportability ground); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371 (criminal charge). 
264 See INA§ 237(a)(4)(A), (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A), (B) (deportability grounds); 18 
U.S .C. §§ 2331 - 2339D (2000) (criminal charges). 
265 See INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S .C. § I 227(a)(2)(B)(ii) (deportability ground); 21 
U.S .C. § 844 (2000) (criminal charge). 
266 See INA § 237(a)(3)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D) (deportability ground); I 8 U.S.C. 
§ 91 I (2000) (criminal charge). 
267 See INA § 237(a)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(A) (deportability charge); INA 
§ 266(b) (criminal charge). 
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ing,269 nevertheless proscribe activity that is already criminalized. In cases 
based on such charges, a finding of scienter similar to the criminal charge is 
required. 
On the other hand, of the twenty-five separately enumerated statutory 
grounds upon which someone could be ordered expelled, only three210 
charges have no direct criminal corollary: (1) becoming a public charge 
within five years of entry from a cause not arising after admission;271 (2) 
presence or activity that has serious adverse foreign policy consequences;272 
and (3) inadmissibility at the time of admission.273 The first two are virtually 
never used. 274 In addition, the public charge and inadmissible at time of ad-
mission grounds each have an implicit fraud element and thus a de facto 
scienter requirement. Noncitizens seeking admission are required to affirma-
tively demonstrate that they are admissible and will not become a public 
charge. Thus, people charged with either of these two charges are often also 
accused of having been untruthful in their initial applications for admission. 
However, this is not always the case as one can be charged with either of 
these two grounds based upon innocent mistakes made at the time of admis-
sion. In addition, the foreign policy ground is devoid of both a criminal 
corollary and a scienter requirement, but this ground has been used so infre-
quently as to make its impact on the analysis negligible.275 So, while the vast 
majority of expulsion cases involve a finding of scienter and also sanction 
conduct that is already criminal, that is not the case in a very, very small 
minority of cases. This does not, however, seem inconsistent with the crimi-
nal label since criminal law also generally requires a finding of scienter but a 
268 See INA§ 237(a)(2)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) (2000) (deportability ground); 
see, e.g., N.Y. P EN AL LAW § 215.50(3) (criminal charge). 
269 See INA § 237(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(6) (deportability ground); 18 U.S.C. § 611 
(2000) (criminal charge). 
270 A few other deportability charges have no criminal corollary, but none of these are 
applicable to permanent residents and thus they are not relevant to the expulsion analysis as I 
have defined it. See INA § 237(a)(l)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(B) (unlawful presence); INA 
§ 237(a)(l)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(C) (violation of nonimmigrant status); INA 
§ 237(a)(l)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(D) (termination of conditional residence). 
211 See INA § 237(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5). 
272 See INA§ 237(a)(4)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C). 
273 See INA § 237(a)(l)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(J)(A). 
274 A Westlaw search of the Board of Immigration Appeals database and the database 
containing all federal cases revealed not a single case in which the government charged 
a noncitizen under the foreign policy deportation ground, INA § 237(a)(4)(C), 8 U.S.C. 
§ l 227(a)(4)(C) (2006), and only one case where a noncitizen was charged under the public 
charge deportation ground, INA § 237(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5) (2006). Moreover, data 
obtained by the author from the Executive Office of Immigration Review through the Freedom 
of Information Act reveals that of the 417,986 cases received by the federal immigration courts 
over fiscal years 2002-2007, which charged a ground of deportability, only thirty-four cases 
(or 0.000081 %) involved a charge under§ 237(a)(5) (becoming a public charge) and only 
three cases (0.000007%) involved a charge under § 237(a)(4)(C) (foreign policy deportation 
ground). (FOIA data is on file with the author). 
275 See id. 
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small minority of crimes are strict liability offenses with no scienter 
requirement. 
The contrast with exclusion is sharp. People seeking admission to the 
United States can be denied entry for virtually any reason.276 The INA con-
tains enumerated grounds of inadmissibility that will necessarily trigger ex-
clusion.277 Some of these grounds, like the charges for expulsion, are based 
on criminal convictions or conduct that is otherwise criminal;278 however, 
many inadmissibility grounds have nothing to do with criminal activity and 
have no scienter requirement. 279 For example, indigency and infection with 
certain communicable diseases are statutory barriers to admission. 280 Moreo-
ver, even if a noncitizen does not fall within one of the enumerated inadmis-
sibility grounds, she will nonetheless be excluded if she does not have the 
necessary family ties or other avenue to obtain a visa for entry.281 
Accordingly, this factor militates in favor of characterizing expulsion as 
criminal but exclusion as civil. We must be careful, however, not to over-
state the importance of this factor in concluding that expulsion is criminal. 
The Supreme Court has, at times, discounted the import of this factor in 
noting that "Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in 
respect to the same act or omission."282 Moreover, the Court has deemed 
some sanctions with an even closer nexus to criminal activity than expulsion 
to be civil. In Smith v. Doe, for example, the Supreme Court ruled that a sex 
offender registration law was civil notwithstanding the fact that the sanction 
was "imposed upon convicted sex offenders and no one else."283 Neverthe-
less, the fact that a sanction, such as expulsion, is conditioned on commis-
sion of a crime in virtually all cases must be considered as at least some 
evidence of that sanction's criminal nature. 284 
276 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) ("This Court has repeatedly emphasized that 
'over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is 
over' the admission of aliens." (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 
320, 339 (1909))); United States v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (commenting that 
the decision whether to admit a noncitizen into the United States has been committed by 
Congress to the discretion of the Attorney General). See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Discre-
tionary Deportation, 20 Geo. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2006) (discussing the structure of rules and 
discretion in immigration policy). 
277 See INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a) (2000). 
278 See, e.g., INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § l l 82(a)(2) (enumerating criminal grounds of 
inadmissibility); INA § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(3)(B) (terrorism ground of inad-
missibility). 
279 See, e.g., INA § 212(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(l) (health related grounds); INA 
§ 212(a)(4), 8 U.S .C. § l 182(a)(4) (public charge grounds); INA § 212(a)(5), 8 U.S .C. 
§ l 182(a)(5) (labor certification grounds). 
280 See INA§ 212(a)(4) (public charge ground); INA § 212(a)(l) (health related grounds). 
281 See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2004); INA § 20l(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1151 (b )(2)(A)(i) (2000). 
282 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 250 (1980). 
283 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 113 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
284 See, e.g., Desimone v. State, 116 Nev. 195, 204-05 (2000) (holding that a tax, which 
"hinges on the commission of a crime and realistically, will normally be exacted only after the 
taxpayer is apprehended and subject to arrest for the same conduct giving rise to the tax obli-
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d. Whether the Sanction Promotes Traditional Aims of Punishment 
The two traditional aims of punishment recognized in this inquiry are 
deterrence and retribution.28~ Our increasingly harsh immigration laws 
clearly have both the purpose and effect of deterring the sanctioned behav-
ior. But the Supreme Court has cautioned that civil sanctions often also have 
the purpose and effect of deterring the targeted behavior. 286 Thus, the proba-
tive value of the deterrent effect and purpose is minimal. 
Removal laws are retributive in purpose to the extent Congress in-
tended to visit hardship upon noncitizens because of their perceived mis-
deeds. This requires an inquiry into legislative intent. The congressional 
record contains ample evidence that grounds triggering expulsion have 
grown increasingly harsh, driven, in part, by a retributive desire to punish 
noncitizens who engage in criminal activity. For example, various members 
of Congress have described the purpose of expulsion laws as to "punish 
those who engage in terrorism,"287 to "punish criminal aliens,"288 "to ad-
vance anti-immigrant attitudes,"289 and to "re-punish them" for past 
crime.290 The weight of this factor is not diluted because alternative non-
penal purposes or effects also exist. That consideration is provided for in the 
remaining Mendoza-Martinez factors, outlined below. 
While exclusion grounds have been similarly expanded, and while 
some of the congressional rhetoric surrounding those expansions are tainted 
by a similar anti-immigrant virulence, it is important not to confuse xeno-
phobic instincts with a retributive purpose. That is to say, when Congress 
has sought to tighten the borders against those seeking to immigrate to the 
United States, it is difficult to conceive of that as a response to past mis-
deeds as much as it is a response to fear, driven either by sound policy or by 
irrational xenophobia, of misdeeds that will be committed in the future. 
Thus, while there may be some retributive rhetoric with regard to exclusion 
gation," is a criminal sanction for double jeopardy purposes); Comm'r v. Mullins, 428 Mass. 
406, 409-16 (1998) (holding that a controlled substance tax conditioned on the commission of 
a crime is a criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes). 
285 It is difficult to offer a principled defense of the Court's focus on these two aims of 
punishment to the exclusion of other traditional aims of punishment such as incapacitation and 
rehabilitation. Nonetheless, since the utility of applying the modern civil-criminal divide test to 
the removal context is to promote consistency and coherence within our legal doctrine, I do not 
here seek to critique the doctrine. Rather, I am merely applying the doctrine as is. 
286 Smith, 538 U.S. at 102. 
287 H.R. REP. No. 104-383, at 37 (1995) (statement of Rep. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, 
House Judiciary Comm.). 
288 141 CoNG. Rec. S7803-01 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
289 142 CONG. Rec. E646 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Mink). 
290 146 CONG. RE.c. S9381-05, *S9388 (Sept. 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Graham); see 
also Ryan, supra note 38, at 1012 (collecting legislative history quotes demonstrating retribu-
tive intent); Bleichmar, supra note 37, at 150 n.204 ("Members of Congress viewed a crimi-
nally convicted alien as abusing the invitation extended to aliens by the United States to enter 
and to reside within its territory."). 
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of people with criminal convictions, it is difficult to conceive of exclusion 
laws generally as driven by a retributive purpose. 
Removal laws are retributive in effect to the extent that persons subject 
to those laws are ostracized and perceived as deserving of hardship in reac-
tion to their perceived misdeeds. To examine this retributive "effect," if any, 
we must look to the societal treatment of deportees where they live. Many 
deportees, especially those deported as the result of criminal convictions, 
continue to suffer serious reprisals after they are returned to their country of 
origin. Some countries publicly shame deportees by publishing their photos 
in newspapers; others restrict deportees' access to work and subject them to 
routine police harassment; and some countries even subject deportees to pro-
longed detention upon their return. 291 While this factor has not been afforded 
considerable weight, it too cuts in favor of characterizing expulsion as crimi-
nal and exclusion as civil. 
e. Whether There Is Any Rational, Alternative, Nonpunitive Purpose 
or Whether the Sanction Is Excessive in Relation to That 
Purpose 
I combine the final two Mendoza-Martinez factors here because, while 
these factors were originally introduced as distinct indicators, they are now 
understood as mutually exclusive alternatives. As the Supreme Court re-
cently explained, either the sanction "has a rational connection to a nonpuni-
tive purpose; or [it] is excessive with respect to this purpose."292 The Court 
has described this inquiry as the "most significant factor" in the criminal-
civil analysis. 
The first difficulty with this factor is that the Court has defined 
"nonpunitive purpose" so broadly that virtually any section of any penal 
code could be deemed to serve a nonpunitive purpose. For example, incapac-
itation and promoting public safety are frequently cited as nonpunitive pur-
poses, though virtually every criminal statute seeks to promote these aims. 293 
Accordingly, the real focus of the inquiry is on whether the sanction is ex-
cessive in relation to the nonpunitive purpose. 
Clearly, expulsion can serve the nonpunitive purpose of permanently 
incapacitating people who have committed crimes (at least with regard to 
their capacity to do harm in the United States) and thereby promoting public 
safety. However, expulsion laws are excessive in relation to that purpose in 
two ways. First, the criminal grounds of deportation are so vast that they are 
291 See Bryan Lonegan, Forced to Go Home Again, N.Y. T!MEs, Feb. 27, 2005, § 14, at 11. 
292 Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (2003) (emphasis added). 
293 See, e.g., id. at 87 (concluding that the "Act has a rational connection to a legitimate 
nonpunitive purpose, public safety, which is advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex 
offenders in their community"); State v. Walls, 558 S.E.2d 524, 526 (S.C. 2002) (concluding 
that in creating a sex offender registry, the Assembly intended "to create a nonpunitive act," 
as it "did not intend to punish sex offenders, but instead intended to protect the public from 
those sex offenders who may reoffend and to aid law enforcement in solving sex crimes"). 
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imposed on people convicted of the most minor offenses, who pose no real-
istic threat to public safety. For example, a person a state deems to be a good 
candidate for full rehabilitation, and who is spared a criminal conviction in 
favor of some diversionary program, can nonetheless be considered "con-
victed" under federal immigration law and expelled.294 In addition, ex-
tremely minor offenses with no significant public safety implication, like 
jumping a turnstile twice in New York, will subject a permanent resident 
who has lived in the United States since childhood to a lifetime of exile from 
his home, family, and livelihood. 295 It is difficult to envision how a sanction 
that has been described by the Supreme Court as "the loss of all that makes 
life worth living"296 can be anything but excessive when imposed upon 
someone whom a state deems a good candidate for rehabilitation, not even 
worthy of a conviction, or upon someone convicted of an offense as minor 
as turnstile jumping. 
Second, expulsion laws are excessive in relation to the goal of promot-
ing public safety insofar as they prohibit an individualized assessment of 
future dangerousness. In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court specifically con-
sidered whether a lack of individualized assessment of future dangerousness 
made a sanction excessive in relation to the non-penal goal of promoting 
public safety.297 In that case the sanction was the inclusion of all persons 
convicted of sex crimes on a sex offender registry.298 The Court held that the 
"State's determination to legislate with respect to convicted sex offenders as 
a class, rather than require individual determination of their dangerousness, 
does not make the statute a punishment."299 Nonetheless, the Court's ratio-
nale was explicitly reliant upon the fact that it viewed sex offender registra-
tion as a "minor" sanction and that the "risk of recidivism posed by sex 
offenders is frighteningly high."300 In contrast, the Court remarked, when 
294 INA § IOl(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § l l0l(a)(48)(A) (Supp. II 1996); In re Roldan-
Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512, 521 (BIA 1999), vacated sub nom, Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 
222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000). 
295 See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 165.15 (2000) (theft of services); see also INA 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S .C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2000) (authorizing deportation for nonci-
tizens convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude); Ancheta v. Gonzales, 216 
Fed.App'x. 667 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding removal order based on finding that theft of service 
is a crime involving moral turpitude); Salgado v. Gonzales, 169 Fed.App'x. 373 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(same); Yesil v. Reno, 973 F. Supp. 372, 376 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that theft of service 
in New York is a crime involving moral turpitude). 
296 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ng 
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
297 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103-04 (2003). 
29s Id. 
299 Id. at l 04. 
300 Id. at 103-04 (internal quotations omitted). Compare Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
346, 369 (1997) (requiring individualized assessment of dangerousness for grave sanction of 
civil commitment), and De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (permitting blanket 
application of relatively minor sanction of prohibition on felons serving as officers or agents of 
a union), with Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 197 (1898) (permitting blanket application 
of relatively minor sanction of prohibition on felons practicing medicine) , and Does v. City of 
Indianapolis, No. 06-865, 2006 WL 2927598, *8-9 (S.D. Ind. Oct 5, 2006) (striking down 
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involuntary confinement was the sanction, "the magnitude of the sanction 
made individual assessment appropriate."301 
In the expulsion system, the statutory scheme denies many individual-
ized assessments necessary to determine whether the sanction is required to 
satisfy the state's interest at two critical junctures: (a) the bond determination 
and (b) the removal decision. The majority of all permanent residents 
charged in removal proceedings are subject to mandatory detention during 
the pendency of their proceedings. 302 This detention can last weeks, months, 
and in some cases years. The mandatory detention scheme is purportedly 
intended to serve the non-penal interests of protecting society from future 
crimes committed by the respondents and of assuring that they do not ab-
scond during the proceedings. However, unlike Smith, the sanction here-
involuntary confinement-is not minor and, unlike Smith, the respondents 
covered by mandatory detention-some convicted of the most minor of-
fenses-are not as a group necessarily at significant risk of recidivism or 
flight. 303 Under these circumstances, the lack of any individualized assess-
sanctions involving restriction on the freedom of movement, significantly less harsh than ex-
pulsion, as being excessive because they were broader than necessary to protect the public). 
But see Smith, 538 U.S. at I 16-17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (contesting the characterization of 
sex offender registration as minor). 
301 Smith, 538 U.S. at 104 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1977)). 
302 See INA§ 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2000); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 
528 (2003) (holding that mandatory detention provisions of INA do not violate the Due Pro-
cess Clause, but not considering whether such sanction is criminal or civil). Section 236(c) 
applies to most criminal grounds of deportability, which, as discussed supra note 260, com-
prise the vast majority of expulsion cases. 
303 In fact, recent studies demonstrate that non-citizens have significantly lower rates of 
incarceration than the general population. See Kristin Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl, 
Crime, Correction and California: What Does Immigration Have to Do With It?, 9 CALIFOR-
NIA CouNTS, Num. 3 (Feb. 2008) (relying upon data from California); cf Michael Kiefer, 
Migrant Rate of Crime Even with Numbers, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, (Feb. 25, 2008) (report-
ing that a review of criminal justice statistics in Maricopa County, which includes Phoenix, 
suggested that undocumented immigrants are charged with criminal activity at the same rate as 
the general population). When focusing on men ages eighteen to forty, the population that is 
disproportionately likely to be engaged in criminal activity, U.S. born men have incarceration 
rates ten times higher than those of foreign-born men. Butcher & Piel, supra note 303, at 2, 
10. Moreover, immigrants in this age group with characteristics that are positively correlated 
with criminal activity, such as the lack of a high school diploma, have lower rates of incarcera-
tion than U.S. born men. Id. at 19 (finding that U.S. born men with these characteristics are 
incarcerated at a rate of 13.4% compared to only 0.5% for similarly situated foreign born 
men). While these studies do not focus specifically on the issue of recidivism for non-citizens 
who have violated immigration laws, a related study has recently demonstrated that there is no 
difference in the rearrest rates for non-citizens with immigration violations as compared with 
the general non-citizen population. Laura Hickman and Marika J. Suttorp. Are Deportable 
Aliens A Unique Threat to Public Safety? Comparing the Recidivism of Deportable and 
Nondeportable Alien, 7 CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY, Num. I (2008) (relying upon data 
from Los Angeles County). Taken together, these various recent studies demonstrate that im-
migrants in removal proceedings are not at any greater risk of recidivism than the general 
population. 
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ment of future dangerousness and risk of flight appears excessive in relation 
to the non-penal goals. 304 
More troubling still is the ever-expanding category of permanent re-
sidents subject to mandatory deportation. Mandatory deportation means that 
a respondent will be ordered deported because of her criminal conviction 
without any consideration of her positive equities, no matter how extraordi-
nary. For example, under a mandatory deportation scheme a court cannot 
consider a respondent' s decades of residency in the United States, the harsh 
impact on her citizen children or spouse, her honorable United States mili-
tary service, the fact that her crime occurred decades ago, the risk of her 
persecution in her country of origin, or even compelling evidence of her 
rehabilitation. Permanent residents convicted of "aggravated felonies" are 
subject to mandatory deportation. 305 At first blush, this class of respondents 
may seem analogous to the sex offender class, for which the Court in Smith 
held it reasonable to forego an individualized assessment because of the 
class's high risk of recidivism. But, the definition of aggravated felony has 
been expanded to sweep so broadly that now a crime does not need to be 
either aggravated or a felony to fall within the statutory definition of an 
"aggravated felony." For example, a person convicted of shoplifting, who 
does not spend one day in jail but is given a suspended sentence of one year 
is an aggravated felon subject to mandatory deportation. 306 As Justice Souter 
explained: 
The fact that the Act uses past crime as the touchstone, probably 
sweeping in a significant number of people who pose no real threat 
to the community, serves to feed suspicion that something more 
than regulation of safety is going on; when a legislature uses prior 
convictions to impose burdens that outpace the law' s stated civil 
aims, there is room for serious argument that the ulterior purpose 
is to revisit past crimes, not prevent future ones. 307 
In light of the expansive definition of aggravated felony, aggravated felons 
as a class cannot reasonably be described as being at a particularly high risk 
of recidivism or as necessarily posing a future risk to public safety. There-
304 Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536-37 (1979) (upholding pretrial detention as non-
punitive, relying upon the fact that pretrial detainees have a bail hearing to evaluate their risk 
of flight and future dangerousness). 
305 See INA § 10l(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(43) (2000) (defining aggravated felony); 
INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2000) (making permanent residents convicted of aggra-
vated felonies ineligible for cancellation of removal). 
306 See INA § 10l(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2000) (stating that any theft 
crime with a sentence of a year or more is an aggravated felony) ; INA §10l (a)(48)(B), 8 
U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(48)(B) (2000) ("Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence . .. 
is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law 
regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence 
in whole or in part."). 
307 Smith, 538 U.S. at 109 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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fore, given the gravity of the sanction involved in expulsion, mandatory de-
portation is excessive in relation to the non-penal interest of protecting 
public safety. 
In regard to exclusion, the government has several non-penal interests 
other than protecting public safety. Toe government has an obvious interest, 
for example, in protecting society against the importation of health hazards 
and in assessing the economic impact of an applicant's immigration. Most 
importantly, insofar as the nation is unwilling to open its borders to all com-
ers, the government must decide how to allocate the scarce resource of im-
migrant visas. Moreover, the sanction involved in exclusion is often, at least 
for people applying from abroad, the maintenance of the status quo and is 
accordingly significantly less harsh than expulsion. While the exclusion sys-
tem is doubtlessly flawed, it, unlike the expulsion system, seems reasonably 
related to the government's non-penal interests. 
Toe Court has, in deference to the legislature, required that only the 
"clearest proof' that "the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose 
or effect" will override the stated intention of Congress to create a civil 
scheme.308 It is a high threshold to meet, and while some of the Mendoza-
Martinez factors arguably militate in favor of considering exclusion as crim-
inal, the evidence in that regard is far from the "clearest proof' required to 
override Congress's intent to create a civil scheme. In the expulsion context, 
however, the Mendoza-Martinez factors point uniformly toward a criminal 
scheme. Moreover, the two factors that seem to be most central to the 
Court' s analysis, history and evaluation of the non-penal purpose, strongly 
support the criminal label. 
Maintaining well-established precedent is always a significant judicial 
interest, and precedent designating all removal proceedings as civil is more 
than a century old. Nonetheless, the Court's reliance on stare decisis here is 
unwarranted because the original justification for that civil label has been 
repudiated by scholars and abandoned by the Court and because a fresh look 
is necessary to create coherence and consistency with the modem civil-crim-
inal divide jurisprudence. The dissonance justifies a reassessment. Applica-
tion of the modem civil-criminal divide jurisprudence militates in favor of 
deferring to the legislature's civil label for exclusion proceedings, but such 
application also establishes the "clearest proof' that "the statutory scheme 
[is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [Congress ' s] inten-
tion" to create a civil scheme.309 This finding comports with the Framers' 
likely conception, as evidenced by the historical record, that expulsion but 
not exclusion is a criminal punishment. Accordingly, the bifurcated ap-
proach provides compelling reason to redesignate expulsion as a criminal 
punishment. 
308 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S . 242, 248-49 (1980). 
309 Id. 
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I propose that, despite the courts' frequent reliance upon it, the principle 
of stare decisis310 is not the most significant obstacle inhibiting courts from 
reexaming the criminal or civil nature of removal proceedings. Rather, I sus-
pect that courts are inhibited more by ( 1) their adherence to the monolithic 
approach and their resultant difficulty in reconciling the conflicting indica-
tors of the nature of removal proceedings; (2) their inability to conceive of 
how criminal exclusion proceedings would operate; and (3) their fear that 
the application of constitutional criminal protections would undermine the 
government's fundamental interests in such proceedings. The first obstacle 
can be resolved by the bifurcated analysis proposed above. 311 In this section, 
I address the other two obstacles. 
A. The Formal Structure of Criminal Expulsion Proceedings 
If expulsion proceedings were recharacterized as criminal, defendants 
in such proceedings would be entitled to the full panoply of criminal proce-
dural protections provided for in the Constitution.3 12 The structure I set forth 
here is not intended to contain a comprehensive set of procedures for crimi-
nal expulsion proceedings, nor is it the only possible structure for such pro-
ceedings. 3 13 Rather, my intention is merely to offer the outline of one 
possible model toward the aim of demonstrating the workability of such a 
scheme. 
1. Expulsion Triggered by Federal Crimes 
If the government desires to expel a permanent resident for violating a 
federal criminal law, a statutory scheme is already in place to make the ex-
pulsion decision part of the federal criminal process. 314 The current proce-
dure allows the United States Attorney to request that the federal judge 
conduct the defendant's immigration removal proceedings together with the 
sentencing hearing in the criminal case.315 At least one court has recognized 
that when expulsion is ordered through this mechanism, it is a criminal 
sanction.316 
3 10 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
3 11 See discussion supra Part III. 
312 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S . 228, 238 (1896) (holding that noncitizens in 
criminal proceedings get full constitutional protections). 
313 See Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration 
Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1175-84 (2002) (offering a thoughtful alternative structure to 
incorporate removal proceedings into criminal proceedings but not treating removal as a crimi-
nal punishment). 
314 See INA § 238(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c). 
3 15 INA§ 238(c)(I), (2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(I), (2)(A). 
3 16 United States v. Soueiti, 154 F.3d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir.), amended on other grounds, 
162 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The procedure for sentencing a criminal defendant is criminal, 
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The procedures provided for by this statute would need only slight 
modification to make them constitutionally permissible to enforce criminal 
expulsion. Section 237 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which sets 
forth the grounds of deportability, could be amended or read to create a 
crime, the elements of which are (1) being a noncitizen317 and (2) engaging 
in one of the proscribed activities described in § 237. In any criminal prose-
cution against a permanent resident where the government wished to expel 
the defendant, it would simply add an additional count to the indictment 
charging the defendant with violating § 237.318 For example, if the federal 
government prosecuted a permanent resident for distributing a controlled 
substance,319 the government would need to add a second count to the indict-
ment charging the defendant under § 237(a)(2)(B)-the section which au-
thorizes a sentence of expulsion for noncitizens convicted of drug crimes.320 
This would add only the smallest additional component to the determination 
of guilt. Assuming the government could prove the elements of the distribu-
tion charge, the defendant could be found guilty of the § 237 charge if a jury 
found or if a defendant admits that he or she is a noncitizen.321 This finding 
or admission would then justify a finding of guilt under § 237 and would 
authorize the judge to impose a sentence of expulsion in addition to 
whatever other criminal sanctions she sees fit to impose for the underlying 
crime. 
The finding of guilt would not, however, mean an automatic sentence 
of expulsion. The various waivers of deportation could be read as proper 
bases upon which a judge could suspend a sentence of expulsion.322 The 
regardless of whether some portions of the judgment, such as deportation or restitution, might 
also be imposed in a civil proceeding."). 
317 Being a noncitizen is already an element of several federal and state crimes. See, e.g., 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265 .01 ("A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the 
fourth degree when ... [h]e possesses any dangerous or deadly weapon and is not a citizen of 
the United States.") (emphasis added); see also INA § 275(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2000) (i lle-
gal entry). See generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Aliens with Guns: Equal Protection, Fed-
eral Power, and the Second Amendment, 92 IowA L. REv. 891 (2007) (detailing various 
firearms laws that target noncitizens). 
3 18 As to the very small percentage of expulsion cases that are not triggered by criminal 
activity, see discussion supra Part III.C.2.c, the government would have to initiate a freestand-
ing § 237 prosecution. 
319 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000). 
320 Such a defendant could also be charged with violating INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000), pertaining to aggravated felonies . See INA 
§ IOl(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1 IOI (a)(43)(B) (2000) (classifying illicit trafficking in a con-
trolled substance as an aggravated felony). 
32 1 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 221 (2005) (affirming the holding in 
Blakely that "the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
defendant") (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S . 296, 303 (2004)); Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."). 
322 See, e.g., INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2000) (granting discretion to Attorney 
General to cancel the removal of certain lawful permanent residents). 
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current procedures for making the discretionary determination whether to 
grant one of the statutory waivers are very similar to a federal sentencing 
hearing. Letters, affidavits, documentary evidence, and testimony are intro-
duced by the respondent in a relatively informal hearing before the judge. 
The prosecution is free to put forth evidence of negative equities and both 
parties are free to challenge each other's evidence and cross-examine wit-
nesses. Federal judges are accustomed to making these types of equitable 
determinations in the sentencing context and incorporating this determina-
tion into a federal criminal sentencing hearing would not dramatically alter 
the nature or magnitude of that proceeding. 
Congress has already recognized the workability of this scheme in re-
gard to federal convictions. In addition, handling the expulsion and the un-
derlying criminal cases together in a single proceeding would also have the 
added benefit of enhancing efficiency.323 
2. Expulsion Triggered by State Crimes 
If the government desired to expel a permanent resident for violation of 
a state criminal law, a separate subsequent324 federal criminal prosecution 
would be required. 325 Again, the elements of the federal prosecution would 
be (1) that the defendant is not a citizen and (2) that she engaged in one of 
the proscribed activities described in § 237. While this would impose some 
additional burden on the United States Attorneys' offices and on the federal 
323 See Taylor, supra note 3 I 3 (discussing the efficiencies of a closer integration of crimi-
nal and immigration adjudications). 
324 The Double Jeopardy Clause would not be any obstacle to this second prosecution 
because the dual sovereignty exception to the double jeopardy analysis permits prosecution by 
a state and by the federal government for the same misdeed. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 
82, 88 (1985); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). 
325 Capturing the efficiency of combining a state criminal prosecution with a removal pro-
ceeding would be impossible because states cannot order expulsion. The federal government 
has prevented state action by occupying the entire field of expulsion law. De Canas v. Bica, 
424 U.S. 351, 354 (I 976) (holding that regulating immigration is an exclusively federal 
power); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 378 (1971) (holding that state laws that 
restrict eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely because of their alienage conflict with 
overriding national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to federal government); 
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 416 (1948) ("The authority to control 
immigration-to admit or exclude aliens-is vested solely in the Federal government."); Chy 
Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) ("The passage of laws which concern the admission 
of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the 
States. . . . If it be otherwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous 
quarrels with other nations."); United States v. Jalilian, 896 F.2d 447, 449 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(stating that states are preempted from banishment). See generally NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 
45, 48 (explaining development of the exclusive nature of federal power of immigration). In 
addition, states lack the power to order persons excluded from sister states, and it would be 
constitutionally problematic for them to order exclusion only as to their individual state. More-
over, there would be substantial adverse policy implications of involving state officials in 
expulsion matters. See generally Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of 
Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004). But cf Taylor, supra note 313 (recog-
nizing policy problems with state enforcement but arguing in favor of a limited role for states 
in removal proceedings). 
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judiciary, this additional burden would be offset by the reduced burden on 
the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, which currently prose-
cutes expulsion cases, and the Executive Office of Immigration Review, 
which currently adjudicates such cases. 
Moreover, while a significant number of these prosecutions would be 
required, each prosecution would be relatively simple in nature. The only 
circumstances in which one of these cases could go to a jury would be when 
a contested issue of fact existed as to whether the defendant was a citizen of 
the United States. Since the government possesses an "alien file" or "A-
file" on every permanent resident containing proof of his or her nationality, 
jury determinations would be required in only highly unusual scenarios. In 
regard to the second element, the factual issue would usually be whether the 
defendant was convicted of a particular state crime. 326 The prosecution could 
establish this fact easily through submission of a state court certificate of 
disposition and the court would be empowered to make the determination of 
the existence of a prior conviction independent of the jury.327 Accordingly, 
the substance of these cases would usually entail the adjudication of any 
legal arguments that a particular state conviction falls within a deportability 
ground and the adjudication, at the sentencing hearing, of any claim for a 
waiver of expulsion. Both tasks are well within the expertise and experience 
of the federal judiciary. 
This type of freestanding, simple criminal immigration prosecution is 
not without precedent. The proceedings I propose would be very similar to 
the current scheme for prosecuting noncitizens for illegal reentry.328 In such 
prosecutions, the government need establish only that the defendant is a 
noncitizen, was removed, and is present. 329 
B. Application of Constitutional Criminal Protections Would Not 
Undermine the Government 's Fundamental Interests 
in Expulsion Cases 
While the formal structure of criminal expulsion proceedings would not 
require a radical departure from current practice, the shift in the rights en-
joyed by respondents/defendants in such proceedings would be dramatic. In 
particular, the application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Ex 
Post Facto Clause, the exclusionary rule and other federal evidentiary rules, 
and the criminal due process requirement that a prosecution occur in the 
district in which the charged crime allegedly took place would collectively 
create a sea change in the level of procedural protections applied in expul-
326 See discussion supra Part III.C.2.b. 
327 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.") (emphasis added). 
328 INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2000). 
329 Id. 
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sion proceedings. 330 While these changes would inevitably make the prose-
cution of these cases somewhat more cumbersome than the current 
administrative procedures, they would not fundamentally undermine the 
government's ability to expel those permanent residents who truly pose a 
significant continuing danger to society. Moreover, the criminal label would 
help resolve the current unsettling disparity between the severity of the sanc-
tion involved and the relatively meek procedural protections in civil removal 
proceedings. 
Undoubtedly, the Sixth Amendment would require the appointment of 
counsel to indigent defendants in criminal expulsion cases. In Scott v. Illi-
nois, 331 the Supreme Court clarified that counsel must be appointed to indi-
gent defendants in any case that "'actually leads to imprisonment'" because 
"incarceration [is] so severe a sanction that it should not be imposed . . . 
unless an indigent defendant [has] been offered appointed counsel to assist 
in his defense, regardless of the cost. "332 The Court reasoned that such ap-
pointment is constitutionally required because "deprivation of liberty is a 
serious matter," and therefore, "actual imprisonment is a penalty different in 
kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment," which do not require 
appointment of counsel. 333 Expulsion, which the Court has characterized as a 
"great hardship" that "may result in the loss of all that makes life worth 
living," 334 is a serious deprivation of liberty more analogous to incarceration 
than to a mere fine. As such, appointment of counsel would be required. This 
would impose a significant expense on the government; however, as the 
Court has recognized, the United States Constitution requires such protec-
tion "regardless of the cost."335 
The application of the Ex Post Facto Clause would prohibit the govern-
ment from retroactively expanding the grounds upon which someone can be 
expelled.336 As the law currently stands, a defendant in a state criminal pro-
330 I exclude the Eighth Amendment from this list because the Supreme Court's most re-
cent pronouncements on the proportionality analysis lead me to believe that such analysis is 
likely to have very little impact in the expulsion context. See, e.g., Riggs v. California, 525 
U.S. 1114, 1114 (1999) (denying writ of certiorari in case challenging "three strikes" law on 
proportionality grounds); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001-09 (1991) (holding that 
mandatory sentence of life without parole for drug possession did not violate Eighth Amend-
ment). I also exclude the Double Jeopardy Clause for the reasons set forth supra note 324 and 
accompanying text. 
331 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
332 /d. at 372-73 (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S . 25, 33 (1972)). 
333 Id. at 373. 
334 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) (characterizing expulsion as "drastic depriva-
tions"); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) ("[D]eportation is a drastic measure and at 
times the equivalent of banishment or exile.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Harisiades 
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952) ("That aliens remain vulnerable to expulsion after 
long residence is a practice that bristles with severities."); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 
232 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (characterizing expulsion as "a life sentence of 
banishment"). 
335 Scott, 440 U.S. at 373. 
336 See generally Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-91 (1789). 
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ceeding can plead guilty to a minor offense explicitly because such a plea 
will not have any immigration consequences. Thereafter, Congress is free, 
under current doctrine, to change the rules of the game and transform the 
same conviction into a deportable offense. 337 This is not a hypothetical sce-
nario. The vast expansions of the grounds of removability over the past two 
decades have been routinely applied to persons convicted before their enact-
ment. 338 As the Supreme Court has explained, such retroactive application 
creates "a sense of harsh incongruity" which may "shock the sense of fair 
play."339 Application of the Ex Post Facto Clause would restore a sense of 
fair play to the expulsion system.340 Moreover, Congress would still be free 
to alter its judgment regarding which offenses warrant the punishment of 
expulsion though it could only do so prospectively. 
Currently, the exclusionary rule does not apply in expulsion proceed-
ings unless there has been an "egregious violation[] of [the] Fourth 
Amendment,"34 1 and the federal rules of evidence are not binding.342 The 
only binding evidentiary rule in civil removal proceedings is that evidence 
must be "material and relevant."343 Thus, for example, hearsay is generally 
admissible in expulsion proceedings. 344 At first glance, application of the 
exclusionary rule and other federal evidentiary rules would appear to impose 
significant additional obstacles to the government in expulsion proceedings. 
However, since the government's burden in such cases will almost always be 
limited to proving the defendant's noncitizen status and the existence of a 
previous conviction,345 the government will be largely unencumbered in es-
tablishing such facts. In almost all cases, the government can establish these 
facts by submission of government records346 or through the defendant's own 
admissions.347 The vast majority of the documentary and testimonial evi-
dence in expulsion proceedings pertains to the factors relevant to establish-
ing eligibility for a waiver of expulsion and to the positive and negative 
337 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (holding that Congress may retroactively 
change removal grounds so long as it clearly expresses its desire to do so). 
338 See Morawetz, supra note 29, at 154-56. 
339 Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530. 
340 See generally Morawetz, supra note 29. 
34 1 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). 
342 See Matter of D-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 827, 831 (BIA 1994). 
343 8 C.F.R. § 1240. l(c); see also Matter of D-, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 830 ("[A]n immigra-
tion judge may receive in evidence any oral or written statement which is material and rele-
vant. ... " (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(c) (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
344 See Matter of Grijalva, 19 I. & N. Dec. 7 I 3, 722 (BIA 1988). 
345 Or the elements of a separate count in the indictment. See discussion supra notes 317-
321 and accompanying text. 
346 FED. R. Evrn. 803(8) (public records exception to hearsay). For example, to establish a 
prior conviction, the government need only offer a certified record of conviction and in order 
to establish noncitizen status, the government need only offer the defendant's birth certificate 
or other documents from the defendant' s "alien file." 
347 FED. R. Evrn. 80l(d)(2). For example, in order to establish the defendant' s noncitizen 
status the government need only submit a copy of the defendant's application for permanent 
resident status from defendant's "alien file," in which the defendant will necessarily admit to 
being born abroad. 
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equities relevant thereto. Since this would be a sentencing issue, the court 
could "consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility 
under the rules of evidence applicable at trial. "348 Thus, application of the 
criminal label would not significantly alter the government's evidentiary bur-
den in such cases. 349 
Finally, application of the criminal due process venue requirements 
would provide important protections for defendants in criminal expulsion 
cases but would not impose a significant burden on the government. In nor-
mal criminal cases, due process and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
require that "the government must prosecute an offense in a district where 
the offense was committed."350 In contrast, the government is free to com-
mence a respondent's civil removal proceedings in any immigration court in 
the nation.351 The most obvious consequence of this discretion in the immi-
gration context is that detained respondents often have their removal pro-
348 U.S.S.G. § 6Al.3(a) (1998). As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Watts: 
"We begin our analysis with 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000), which codifies the longstand-
ing principle that sentencing courts have broad discretion to consider various kinds 
of information. The statute states: 'No limitation shall be placed on the information 
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an of-
fense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of 
imposing an appropriate sentence.' 
519 U.S. 148, 151 (1997) (internal citations omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000); 
United States v. Johnson, 489 F.3d 794, 96-97 (7th Cir. 2007). 
349 Moreover, the criminal label would not dramatically alter the burden of proof in expul-
sion cases. Currently, the government must prove deportability by clear and convincing evi-
dence. INA § 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(3)(A) (2000); see also Woodby v. INS, 385 
U.S. 276, 277 (1966) ("We have concluded that it is incumbent upon the Government in such 
proceedings to establish the facts supporting deportability by clear, unequivocal, and convinc-
ing evidence."). The criminal label would require the higher proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970), but as discussed at supra notes 346-347 and accom-
panying text, establishing the required elements of a criminal expulsion case would not be 
overly burdensome. In regard to waivers of deportation, respondents currently must carry the 
burden of proof and that would remain true in criminal exclusion cases. Compare United 
States v. Joaquin, 326 F.3d 1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (recognizing that defendant bears 
burden of proof to justify a downward departure), and United States v. Chavez-Chavez, 213 
F.3d 420, 422 (7th Cir. 2000) ("When seeking a downward departure the defendant bears the 
burden."), with In re S-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 462 (BIA 2002) (recognizing that respondent bears 
burden of proof to justify waiver of deportation), and In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 
56, 59 (BIA 2001) (same). 
35° FED. R. CRIM. P. 18; see also United States v. Smith, 452 F.3d 323,334 (4th Cir. 2006) 
("Our Constitution sets forth the basic parameters for venue in a criminal case .. . [ which] 
protect criminal defendants from the inconvenience and prejudice of prosecution in a far-flung 
district bearing no connection to their offenses."); United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 830 
(11th Cir. I 982) ("The right of criminal defendants to be tried in the state and judicial district 
in which the alleged crime occurred is guaranteed by article ill of and the sixth amendment to 
the United States Constitution."). 
351 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14 (granting government discretion to initiate removal proceedings in 
any immigration court); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.20(a) (stating that venue is proper in the immigration 
court where the proceeding was commenced); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.20(b) (stating that venue may 
only be changed upon a showing of good cause); Matter of Seren, 15 I. & N. Dec. 590, 591 
(BIA 1976) (holding that the Service may decide in the first instance where a removal hearing 
should be held). 
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ceedings thousands of miles away from their families , witnesses, and 
attorneys. 352 
Another less obvious but equally disturbing consequence of the govern-
ment's broad discretion over venue in civil removal cases is the inability of 
the respondents to predict what law will be applied. An immigration judge is 
bound by the decisions of the circuit court having jurisdiction over the phys-
ical place where the judge sits.353 When a noncitizen in a state criminal case 
is deciding whether to plead guilty to a particular charge, that noncitizen has 
no way to accurately assess the immigration consequence of that charge be-
cause she cannot predict where any subsequent removal proceedings will 
take place and thus which circuit's law will eventually be applied.354 If expul-
sion proceedings were recharacterized as criminal, venue would lie where 
the underlying criminal prosecution took place, and thus there would be no 
uncertainty as to what circuit law would be applied. In addition, this change 
would eliminate the current incentive for the government to forum shop and 
defendants would be more likely to be prosecuted near critical witnesses, 
family members, and their attorneys. The only additional cost to the govern-
ment would be the administrative inconvenience of having to hold a pro-
ceeding in a particular judicial district rather than in the district of its choice. 
352 See Angeles v. District Dir., 729 F. Supp. 479, 484-85 (D. Md. 1990) (holding no 
denial of due process when Immigration Judge denied motion to change venue for resident 
alien in exclusion proceedings who was "wrongfully detained" by the INS in Seattle and 
sought to have the hearing moved to Maryland, where she resided); In re Rahman, 20 I. & N. 
Dec. 480 (BIA 1992) (holding a grant of change of venue on the grounds that detained alien 
had retained counsel at a new location was an abuse of the immigration judge's discretion 
when "there [was] no evidence of any long-standing attorney-client relationship"); see also 
Nancy Morawetz, Detention Decisions and Access to Habeas Corpus for Immigrants Facing 
Deportation, 25 B.C. Tunm WORLD L.J. 13, 16 n.16 (2005); Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting 
Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CoNN. L. 
REv. 1647, 1674 n.97 (1997) ("[A]llegations that a detained alien 's counsel of choice and 
witnesses would be available in another location, standing alone, do not establish 'good cause' 
sufficient to overcome the Service' s opposition to a requested venue change.") (citing In re 
Rahman, 20 I. & N. Dec. 480 (BIA 1992)); 
353 Peters v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2004); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) 
(2000) (requiring that a petition for review of removal proceedings "shall be filed with the 
court of appeals for the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the 
proceedings"). 
354 fur example, under Ninth Circuit law, a person sentenced for a drug offense under a 
first offender treatment program is not considered convicted for immigration purposes. Lujan-
Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 735 (9th Cir. 2000). However, outside the Ninth Circuit, 
the Board of Immigration Appeals decision in In re Roldan, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512, 521 (BIA 
1999), controls. That decision holds that a person sentenced for a drug offense under a first 
offender treatment program is convicted for immigration purposes. Accordingly, if a perma-
nent resident is arrested in California on drug possession and is offered a first offender treat-
ment if he pleads guilty, his attorney may correctly advise him that the plea will not be a 
conviction for immigration purposes under the controlling Ninth Circuit law and, therefore, he 
will not be deportable. See INA§ 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2000) (requir-
ing a formal conviction to deport someone for a controlled substance offense). However, if the 
federal immigration authorities initiate removal proceedings against him outside the Ninth Cir-
cuit, In re Roldan will control and he will be deportable and could even be subject to 
mandatory deportation. There is simply no way to give correct, definitive advice to a client 
when an attorney cannot predict which law will be applied. 
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There would, of course, be costs associated with recharacterizing expul-
sion proceedings as criminal. The most significant cost would be the expense 
of providing assigned counsel to indigent defendants in expulsion cases. 
These costs would not, however, undermine the government's critical inter-
est in these proceedings: permanently incapacitating noncitizens who pose a 
significant danger of future harm. The formal structure of criminal expulsion 
proceedings is analogous to current provisions in the federal law, and the 
additional protections noncitizens would obtain in such proceedings would 
not impose an unwarranted burden on the government. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The increased entanglement of criminal and immigration law is argua-
bly the most significant and disturbing development in immigration law over 
the past three decades. 355 In the past thirty years, we have seen an explosion 
in the criminal grounds of removability, in the number of immigrants facing 
removal because of their involvement in criminal proceedings, and in public 
perception conflating immigrants with criminals. However, this trend has 
failed to provoke courts to reexamine the long-standing rule that immigra-
tion removal proceedings are purely civil in nature. The reason for courts' 
inertia goes beyond their frequent invocation of the principle of stare deci-
sis. Courts are unwilling to reexamine whether the civil or criminal label 
should be applied to immigration removal proceedings because it is an im-
possible task. All relevant indicators provide contradictory guidance and it 
is impossible to construct an intellectually honest and persuasive argument 
for attaching either the civil or criminal label to all removal proceedings. 
Both courts and scholars have failed to appreciate that "immigration re-
moval proceedings" are an ill-conceived category that embodies two distinct 
proceedings-exclusion and expulsion-the true nature of which can only 
be ascertained if each is analyzed independently. The bifurcated approach I 
propose offers courts an avenue out of the paralysis-a practical and worka-
ble method by which to reconcile the otherwise contradictory guidance of 
history and the modem Mendoza-Martinez/Ward doctrine. 
It is somewhat counterintuitive that redesignating expulsion proceed-
ings as criminal would do anything to address the problematic aspects of the 
criminalization of immigration law. To the contrary, being saddled with a 
criminal record carries a host of significant collateral consequences in a 
range of civil arenas, including housing, employment, and public benefits 
355 See Nora v. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforce-
ment Tools in the "War" On Terrorism ?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1059-61 , 1073, 1093 (2002); 
Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After Sep-
tember 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 82-84 (2005); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration 
Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 367, 376 (2006); But cf 
Taylor, supra note 313 (arguing for the closer integration of criminal and immigration 
adjudications). 
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disabilities. 356 People in criminal expulsion proceedings would, in theory, 
face the same range of consequences. However, many of these common and 
often devastating collateral consequences would be simply inapplicable to 
people expelled from the nation. The more problematic consequences of the 
criminal label for people in expulsion proceedings would be the political and 
social implications of the criminal label. The social stigma of the criminal 
conviction would likely follow people who are expelled back to their coun-
tries of origin. The political marginalization caused by the criminal label 
would mean that efforts to reform criminal expulsion laws would likely meet 
with significant political obstacles. The reality is, however, that there is al-
ready significant social stigma associated with being deported and immi-
grants facing deportation are among the most politically marginalized groups 
in American society. So, the current situation is the worst of all worlds: 
people in removal proceedings suffer similar social and political conse-
quences to people in criminal proceedings but fail to receive any of the con-
stitutional protections designed to shelter criminal defendants. 
In addition to the general virtue of bringing consistency and coherence 
to a currently indefensible doctrine, the bifurcated approach would, on bal-
ance, represent a significant step forward for immigrants facing both exclu-
sion and expulsion. Currently both groups suffer by association with the 
other. Immigrants in expulsion proceedings suffer because, being grouped 
together with noncitizens facing exclusion, the proceedings are mis-
characterized as civil and thus the respondents do not receive the critical 
criminal constitutional protection. Noncitizens facing exclusion suffer be-
cause, being grouped together with noncitizens facing expulsion, they are 
subject to the popular conception of immigrants in removal proceedings as 
criminals and are subject to unwarrantedly harsh treatment as a result 
thereof. Thus, the bifurcated approach would significantly improve both the 
integrity of the doctrine and the lived experience of immigrants facing exclu-
sion and expulsion proceedings. 
356 See, e.g., 'fHE BRONX DEFENDERS, CIVIL AcrION PROJECf, THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN NEw YORK STATE (2007), available at http://www.reentry.net/pub-
lic2/library/attachment.l 08661 . 
